

JPRS-WER-86-120

8 DECEMBER 1986

# West Europe Report

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## WEST EUROPE REPORT

### CONTENTS

#### POLITICAL

##### BELGIUM

Walloons Polled on Attitude Toward Happart Affairs (LA LIBRE BELGIQUE, 17 Oct 86) .....	1
Flemish Socialists Divided on Strategy (LE SOIR, 28 Oct 86) .....	4

##### FINLAND

President Koivisto on Military Importance of Nordic Seas (HELSINGIN SANOMAT, various dates) .....	6
Paasikivi Seura Speech, by Mauno Koivisto	6
Main Points of Proposal	13
Redirect Nordic Attention, Editorial	14
Analyses by Other Papers	15
Norwegian, Swedish, U.S. Context, Editorial	17

##### NETHERLANDS

De Vries on Relations With Lubbers, Cabinet, KOK (Bert De Vries Interview; DE TIJD, 17 Oct 86) .....	19
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##### SPAIN

Financing, Administration of Intelligence Collection Detailed (Santiago Aroca; TIEMPO, 27 Oct 86) .....	28
AP Secretary Discusses Status, Future of Party (Alberto Ruiz-Gallardon Interview; EPOCA, 20 Oct 86) ....	33

Racial Tensions Reportedly Increasing in Melilla (EL ALCAZAR, 24 Oct 86) .....	45
Anti-Spanish Pamphlets Distributed Muslim Leader Threatens Resignation, by Olvido Obregon	46
<b>TURKEY</b>	
Kurds Protest Human Rights Violations (Vienna Domestic Service, 21 Nov 86) .....	49
<b>ECONOMIC</b>	
<b>FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY</b>	
Agreement Reached on Soviet Use of Rhine-Main-Danube Canal (Gerhard Hennemann; SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 30 Oct 86) ....	51
Kiechle Reviews Structural, Marketing Problems in Agriculture 'Klaus Peter Krause; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 25 Oct 86)	53
<b>TURKEY</b>	
Institute Acknowledges Poor GNP Accounting Methods (CUMHURIYET, 26 Aug 86) .....	58
Complaints About Textile Quota Distribution Discussed (Meral Tamer; CUMHURIYET, 27 Aug 86) .....	60
Three Major Routes of Turnpike Project Described (TERCUMAN, 26 Aug 86) .....	63
<b>MILITARY</b>	
<b>FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY</b>	
Von Buelow Urges Forward Defense Role for Territorial Units (SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 20 Oct 86; DIE WELT, 20 Oct 86)	65
Not Discussed Within SPD Conservative Critique of Proposal, by Ruediger Moniac	66
<b>SPAIN</b>	
Increase Reported in Military Technological Research (Pedro Conde Zabala; LA VANGUARDIA, 22 Oct 86) .....	68
Military Chiefs Criticize New Defense Budget (Olvido Obregon; EL ALCAZAR, 23 Oct 86) .....	70

**Defense Minister Reportedly Plans Reorganization  
(Fernando Reinlein; DIARIO 16, 30 Oct 86) .....** 73

**SWEDEN**

**Military Reports Reveal Suspected Sub Incursions  
(Anders Ohman; DAGENS NYHETER, 21, 24 Oct 86) .....** 77

**Mine Sweeper Makes Probable Sighting  
Coastal Corvette Hydrophone Spots Sub** 79

**ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES**

**SPAIN**

**Sulfuric Acid Suspected of Causing Huelva Fish Kill  
(Vicente Quiroga; ABC, 23 Oct 86) .....** 82

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POLITICAL

BELGIUM

WALLOONS POLLED ON ATTITUDE TOWARD HAPPART AFFAIR

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 17 Oct 86 p 3

[Article: "Cautious Walloons React to the Happart Affair"]

[Text] A LIBRE BELGIQUE-Walloon Sociology Group (UCL) poll rejects the "follow through to the end" approach and does not follow Jose Happart to the point of crisis.

On Tuesday and Wednesday--i.e., at the height of the latest Fourons crisis--the Louvain Catholic University's Walloon Sociology Group carried out a telephone opinion poll expressly on the Happart affair. From it, we are publishing several questions which can undoubtedly shed light on tomorrow's solutions, and in particular can inform the majority concerning the position of its electorate.

Ten Percent Worried

Here are a few current affairs problems. Which worries you the most?

	<u>Percent</u>
The unemployment situation	47.67
Terrorism	26.83
Taxes	11.67
The Fourons	9.67
Missiles in Europe	4.00

Only one person refused to answer.

Thus the Fourons come only in fourth and next to last place in the concerns of Walloons, behind employment, terrorism, and taxes. Socialist voters (16.8 percent) show more interest in the situation than the Liberals (6.3 percent), Social Christians (4.8 percent) and Ecolos (3.8 percent), but for them also the main concern is employment (47.8 percent) as it is, moreover, for the other parties (56.8 percent of PSC voters, 44.1 percent for the PRL, but only 23.1 percent for the Ecolos who place the missiles as the first of their concerns). The age group that includes those 66 years of age and older attach the greatest importance to the Fourons (14.7 percent) while those in the 26-45

age bracket attach the least importance to them (9.1 percent). Surprisingly, it is in Namur province that one encounters the largest number of people "worried" about the Fcurons situation (12.5 percent); Liege residents come only in second place (11.2 percent), and are followed by the Walloon Brabantcons (10.9 percent), the Hennuyers (8.6 percent) and the people of Luxembourg (4.4 percent).

#### A Walloon Struggle

Do you think that the Happart struggle is Wallonia's struggle to defend its rights against Flanders?

	<u>Percent</u>
Yes	59.83
No	24.50
Don't know	15.67

Here also, the answers were clearly more positive among the Socialists (73.9 percent), and also among the Ecolos (69.2 percent), than among Social Christian voters (53.6 percent) and Liberals (51.4 percent). The largest number of negative replies was recorded among the Liberals (36.9 percent), ahead of the Social Christians (31.2 percent).

#### Do Not Bring About the Fall of the Government

Should the francophone parties of the present majority (PSC-PRL) support Jose Happart to the point of bringing about the fall of the current government?

	<u>Percent</u>
Yes	33.83
No	46.50
Don't know	19.67

The answer is no, especially among the majority Social Christians, more than among the Liberals: 64.8 percent say no and 17.6 percent say yes among PSC voters, and 58.6 percent no and 28.8 percent yes among PRL voters. The two francophone parties in the majority would therefore disappoint their supporters if they were to cause a crisis over the Happart affair, a crisis which is hoped for by 48.9 percent of Socialists and 42.3 percent of Ecolos.

The greatest number of those opposing a crisis are found in the 46-65 age group (52.1 percent) and also among Liege inhabitants (56.2 percent), more strongly against than Luxembourg people (53.3 percent), the Brabantcons (47.3 percent), the Hennuyers (41.1 percent), and Namur residents (35.9 percent); moreover, Namur residents are alone in preferring a crisis (42.2 percent) to an agreement (42.2 percent).

Another Burgomaster

Here is a possible scenario for the Fourons: if Jose Happart is first alderman, would you accept the appointment of another francophone but bilingual leader as Fourons burgomaster?

	<u>Percent</u>
Yes	52.50
No	28.50
Don't know	18.83

Whereas in a parallel poll a large majority showed themselves in favor of Jose Happart becoming burgomaster of the Fourons, an identical majority favors a compromise solution to avoid a crisis. The acceptance of another burgomaster, francophone but bilingual, is particularly noticeable among Social Christian voters (63.7 percent), and Liberals (57.7 percent), and also among the Ecolos (61.5 percent); and more Socialists accept this solution than reject it: 44 percent as against 40.2 percent.

Those most in favor are people in the 26-45 age bracket (59.2 percent), the Walloon Brabancs (56.4 percent), the Hennuyers (54.7 percent), Luxembourg residents (51.1 percent), and Liege people (50.8 percent); the most "hardline" are once again Namur inhabitants (46.9 percent favoring a compromise solution compared with 37.5 percent against).

[boxed item]

This poll was taken at the request of LA LIBRE BELGIQUE on Tuesday 14 and Wednesday 15 October by telephone, using a sample of 600 people representative of the Walloon population.

The sample is stratified according to sex, socio-vocational status, age, and province. There were 22 questioners.

The poll was carried out by the Louvain Catholic University's Walloon Sociology Group under the direction of Jacques Lefevre and Luc Albarello, in collaboration with F. Van Impe, G. Langen, G. Haccourt, and M. Collinge, researchers in the UCL Walloon sociology department.

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POLITICAL

BELGIUM

### FLEMISH SOCIALISTS DIVIDED ON STRATEGY

Brussels LE SOIR in French 28 Oct 86 p 2

[Article: "SP Congress; Karel Van Miert Cornered Between Oppositionists and Participationists"]

[Text] As was expected, the SP congress held on Saturday in Gand witnessed the muted confrontation of the party's "participationists" and "oppositionists." The issue, once again, was the Florennes missiles. But obviously the real debate was kept until later. Until the day when the Socialists will be involved in government negotiations?

Seated to the right of the table, seen from the room, was Willy Claes. On the left, Louis Tobback. Between them, Socialist Party president Karel Van Miert. A symbolic scene?

Tobback: "I am saying quite simply that I will not vote for participating in a government that leaves the Florennes missiles in place." Opposition pure and simple.

Claes: "Things are not that simple. Everything the Socialists are against are being implemented under Martens VI." Meaning: it is time that the Socialists got back to business. Between these two contradictory poles, a troubled president, at times visibly upset, who in his introductory speech stated with a touch of bitterness that "it is sometimes more difficult for a party president to keep his friends than to cause trouble for his enemies. Politics is often a hard and thankless task." He concluded by quoting a poem by Achille Mussche: "This I can say, speaking for myself: in all my life, I have never bowed my head. Not before anyone, and especially not before the mighty (...). I am a man in revolt, a resister, and I have always remained faithful to what was my only master: the voice of my conscience."

An ovation, vibrant and unanimous. Later in the day, Tobback said: "The only candidate for the presidency (Editor's note: next March), as far as I'm concerned, is Karel Van Miert." Willy Claes commented: "I'm 300 percent behind what Karel said." No matter. The statutory reassembly held on Saturday in Gand by the Flemish Socialists revealed the tensions, the strategic differences at the very least, which have come to light in the party leadership since these elections of 13 October 1985. A victory, certainly, but a victory without a directly perceptible future. One with as sole perspective the continuation of

an already longlasting role in the opposition.

#### A "Straitjacketed" Congress

Incontestably, the sticking point is the missiles. Not the principle of them: in its final resolution, the congress confirmed the point of view adopted in 1985 concerning "the dismantling of the 16 missiles already installed and opposition to the 32 that are still to be deployed."

The latter are no problem to the SP. They do not want them, and that is that. But what of the other 16, those that are already there? For Van Miert, it is obvious, they have to go. But it becomes quite apparent from his comments that the main problem is to prevent the installation of the other 32. "It is not enough to have good positions and to vote for resolutions. One must be able to act. And for that, one must have power, one must be in a position of strength."

In the government? Even if it means not securing in a government statement a firm and irrevocable commitment to dismantling the 16 missiles already installed. That is what seems to emerge from presidential statements. And that is what Louis Tobback rejects.

It should be noted that the latter occupies a strategic position at the head of the party. As head of the chamber parliamentary group, he leads its shock troops. It is impossible to get round him. The debate was not settled in Gand. That was not the purpose of the reconvening of congress, obviously "strait-jacketed" by the party leaders. Congress President Gilbert Temmerman indicated the fact plainly when proceedings began and Van Miert confirmed it: "We are here to discuss the current political state of affairs and to give directives to our parliamentary groups for the session now beginning; this is not, therefore, a congress on the operation of the party, nor a congress intended to work out a program."

In the shadow of the nuclear missiles, the assembly concentrated on socioeconomic policy; unemployment, a problem the solution of which requires a drastic reduction in the length of work and the implementation of programs aimed at eradicating long-term unemployment; buying power which must be restored by reducing taxes on work income and alternative revenue, to be financed by reducing ineffective "tax expenses" which benefit businesses and financiers; industrial policy, to be directed toward qualitative improvement in production and the competitiveness of businesses; and the budget deficit, of course, which must be reduced by renewed growth, a decline in unemployment, and a reduction in military expenditure.

What about the community question? Of course, that cannot be avoided. On this issue, the SP goes the way of radicalism, Flemish this time, strongly reaffirming that the borders of the Flemish community are not open to discussion; and that a joint parliamentary committee must be formed immediately to work on institutional revision in the direction of federalism.

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

**PRESIDENT KOIVISTO ON MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF NORDIC SEAS**

**Paasikivi Seura Speech**

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 16 Oct 86 p 7

[Text of speech by Finnish President Mauno Koivisto to Paasikivi Society on 15 October 1986]

[Text] Military tension has not increased in Northern Europe according to President Mauno Koivisto even though military activity has increased in the seas and in the airspace above them.

In the president's opinion increased military activity in the seas and increased strategic interest have not disturbed Finland's security policy position. Nevertheless, there is reason to follow developments and find means to influence them, said Koivisto on Wednesday at the Paasikivi Society.

HELSINGIN SANOMAT is publishing President Koivisto's speech in its entirety.

The Italian playwright Luigi Pirandello, whom Urho Kekkonen once quoted, has said: "It is so, if it appears so". Strictly speaking, the situation is rather to the contrary: the situation is seldom exactly as it appears. Our senses give us a deficient picture of reality and in making observations we are inclined to see what we expect to see.

But what is important in Kekkonen's Pirandello quote is the realization that it is not only important how it is, but also how it appears.

It is quite normal that one's own actions are understood to increase security and to bring an equilibrium to the situation while the actions of others are interpreted to be threatening and to increase instability.

In a practical security policy debate it is important to be able to ascertain the prevailing situation and the prevailing trends of development, but observations made from the prevailing reality are not the only things that are important, those impressions of the future which are being developed are also important.

What has thus been development in Northern Europe, how has it been affected by the change in strategy and weapons technology, what are the fluctuations in the international atmosphere?

The fact that an exceptionally large number of security policy reports have been made public in all the Nordic countries during the previous and current year says something about the timeliness of the questions posed. Extensive reports on questions dealing with a Nordic nuclear-free zone have been published in Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark. A similar report is currently being finalized in Iceland.

In addition to this, changes in military strategy have been examined in the studies and reports, which have been compiled by government organs as well as independent research institutes.

A trait common to these recent reports is the observation that naval strategy questions have become more important than before in Northern Europe. The trend in this direction has been apparent and it will also probably continue in the future for many reasons.

#### "The Shortest Flight Patterns May Be Over Nordic Territory"

The growth of the Soviet Union's northern fleet and its concentration in bases in the area of the Kola Peninsula would as such already have been sufficient to make the seas connected to Northern Europe strategically important. This development trend has been further strengthened by the augmentation of the U.S. fleet in recent years as well as by the frequently presented assumptions that the North Atlantic would be of decisive importance in an imagined major European war. It has also been essential that the emphasis of the superpowers with respect to nuclear weapons has to an ever greater degree been transferred to missiles launched from submarines.

The strategic importance of the seas has also been apparent in the fact that military exercises and reconnaissance and other activities of the fleets and air forces have increased in recent years in the northern seas as well as in the direction of the Baltic Sea. As military technology has developed, more operationally effective ships, aircraft, and equipment have appeared in the seas, their airspace, and support bases.

The consequence of technological development is that strategic missile-carrying submarines no longer need to approach the vicinity of the adversary's coastline. The significance of northern sea areas has greatly increased for this reason.

This same technological development has resulted in the fact that long-range cruise missiles have become a strategic weapons system. The majority of them is deployed in the northern hemisphere in reconnaissance aircraft and ships. Theoretically speaking, their shortest flight patterns can traverse over Nordic territory. This causes a problem especially for neutral countries regardless of how we evaluate the intentions of the parties in a possible crisis situation. Indeed, Finland has made appeals on behalf of prohibiting long-range cruise missiles.

This trend has been apparent for a couple decades already, but negotiations being conducted currently on nuclear weapons may in and of themselves only accelerate this trend even more. The United States is in this connection striving to achieve a reduction in the number of Soviet land-based missiles, in particular. From this there is reason to expect that the relative importance of sea- and air-deployed weapons will continue to increase.

All the reports concerning Northern European security express a certain degree of concern about those repercussions which an increase in strategic interest could have for the Nordic area. Some have even been ready to draw the conclusion that tension in Northern Europe is increasing and that the traditional stable situation is being destabilized.

#### "Basic Solutions Have Turned Out To Be Lasting"

Increased military activity in the sea areas and the increase in strategic interest reflected from it do not, however, as such necessarily mean increased tension in Northern Europe. The issue must be examined more closely.

The fundamental situation in the Nordic area has not changed as the result of recent development. The basic security policy solutions of the Nordic countries have turned out to be lasting. The present stable situation in the Nordic area continues to benefit the interests of countries outside of the area also. Be as it may, it is important to follow development affecting the basic situation of the Nordic area from the outside and to seek opportunities to influence it.

Therefore, a mere examination of the qualitative and quantitative development occurring in the area of weaponry is not sufficient. Small countries should give particular attention to views, interpretations, fears, and conscious aspirations in other countries, especially in the superpowers.

The debate on security policy has, in general, been quite abstract in the past few decades. The numbers of missiles, aircraft, submarines, and warheads have been calculated and compared over and over again. The data concerning them, in turn, create the basis for theoretical calculations on how these weapons can be used for strikes and counterstrikes against various targets under different conditions, about which no one has had, and fortunately cannot have, any living experience.

Within the circle of professional researchers of strategy theoretical calculations have in some cases aroused concern, for example, for the fact that resources cannot be found for all the steps of escalation for all the possible crises.

At times it seems that we are forgetting the old rule according to which he who wants to make certain of everything does not make certain of anything.

Most people, however, are not interested in schematic calculations. For them security is an everyday matter, which has a tangible significance in their own life.

In the background one can find people's concern for the future and for the life of future generations which they experience even if they are not versed in strategic calculations. A comprehensive security policy should be able to confirm people's faith in the future.

An attempt was made to accomplish this in the concluding document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe as well as in the CSCE process built on its enforcement. The most recent achievement is comprised of actions increasing trust and security in Europe as well as the document adopted in Stockholm a few weeks ago in the first phase of the conference on disarmament. Persistent and patient work in the Stockholm negotiations has produced results whose effects will be felt throughout all of Europe.

These results will have great significance. Even though they have been made public in a commendably extensive and illustrative manner, apparently time is still needed before they begin to have an effect on the debate underway and on the images of the future. Their significance is certainly comprehended by people other than the theoreticians of strategy.

From our point of view it is especially important that Finland, which does not belong to any military alliances, has been able to play a central role in influencing the formation of international decisions concerning military security. We do not have the same kind of opportunity for this in any other forum. Together with other neutral and nonaligned European countries in the CSCE process Finland has achieved a stable and universally accepted role as a promoter of cooperation and a mediator of conflicts.

With actions accomplished and hopefully to be accomplished in the future to increase trust an attempt is being made to prevent preparations for a surprise attack as well as to reduce the danger of fateful misinterpretations. Since the outbreak of war is presently possible primarily as the consequence of a series of miscalculations and their subsequent countermeasures, making actions to increase trust more effective is, indeed, significant. The reduction of fear will also create a basis for confidential cooperation and the reduction of arms.<sup>15</sup>

It has been considered that it also be possible to monitor compliance with the provisions agreed upon. The major achievement of the Stockholm Conference was namely that considerable progress was made in aspirations regarding inspection and verification.

In the Nordic area fear of a surprise attack has certainly been less than elsewhere in Europe. However, the reduction of fear and tension throughout all of Europe will have a beneficial effect on the Nordic area also. Moreover, new opportunities are opening up for reaching agreement on special measures to increase trust particularly in Northern Europe.

First, however, a few words should be said about nuclear weapons, which the measures agreed upon at the Stockholm Conference do not address. An awareness of the possibility of a surprise attack with nuclear weapons will continue to arouse fear in the minds of many people.

Even a limited nuclear war has not been a feasible means of attempting to resolve a conflict for a long time already. This is understood very well by U.S. and Soviet leaders, who have issued a joint declaration that no one can win in a nuclear war and that such a war must never be allowed to break out.

This is a realization which will remain valid even though unfortunately a complete mutual understanding on the reduction of nuclear weapons was not yet reached last weekend in Reykjavik.

From a sensible point of view even a war fought with conventional weapons between the nuclear states is not probable. However, calculations concerning the course of warfare are being made continually, and they have their own political effect even when their credibility is being questioned.

A lot of thought continues to be given to the idea that military solutions will be achieved by means of conquering large land areas. This is hardly the case. If the military alliances end up in an armed conflict by means of mistakes and miscalculations, strikes would probably be made from a distance and they would be destructive.

If such a conflict were to occur between the East and the West, it is not probable that it would be directly aimed at Finland, but the danger is, indeed, great that such a conflict would also touch us. On the other hand, it is not probable that our country would become the theatre of an extensive land war.

#### **"Importance of YYA [Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid] Pact Is Central"**

Even though an open military conflict between the East and the West is not probable, we must provide for our own defense capability while having full knowledge of our possibilities as well as our conditions. The credibility of our security policy is increased by the agreement concluded in 1948 with the Soviet Union on friendship, cooperation, and mutual aid. It does not contain even the smallest threat against other countries, but from the point of view of Finland's own security the significance of the YYA Pact is of central importance.

Over the decades we have directed attention toward the importance of measures for generating trust in the effort to stabilize the situation in the Nordic area. Without foisting our own ideas on anyone else we have announced our readiness to embark on such measures which would in and of themselves eliminate unnecessary fears and reassure our neighbors and thus increase mutual security. This also concerns the so-called border peace arrangements with Norway on the basis of an initiative made by Urho Kekkonen in 1965.

The formation of a Nordic nuclear-free zone would, for its part, facilitate an increase in trust. A clear interaction between the security of Northern Europe and the security of all of Europe is perceivable even in this matter.

Mutual trust between the peoples and the governments of the Nordic area is even otherwise strong, but a Nordic nuclear-free zone could increase trust in a broader sense. With the help of such an arrangement a few nuclear-free

states -- indeed, with the cooperation of the nuclear states -- could preclude speculations about the use of nuclear weapons in their own area, in this case the Nordic area.

The formation of a nuclear-free zone is not a simple matter. This has been convincingly demonstrated by the reports which have been made on this issue in recent years in the various Nordic countries. At the same time an awareness of the problems has, however, meant a promotion of the debate concerning the formation of a zone -- or perhaps we can say process. Preparations are now being made to commission a joint Nordic position group in accordance with a decision made in August at the conference of Nordic foreign ministers. The objectivity and thoroughness of preparations characteristic of Nordic cooperation will certainly facilitate future work even in this matter.

The collaboration of nuclear states is needed in the formation of a Nordic nuclear-free zone. The Soviet Union, whose territory borders directly on the Nordic area, has presented some significant views on the debate concerning the creation of a zone. The Soviet Union's readiness declared in advance already to adopt measures with respect to its own territory is in itself an indication of the fact that there is in the Soviet Union an understanding of the importance of measures for increasing trust particularly from the point of view of their areawide effect. The same naturally applies to the readiness declared by the Soviet Union to negotiate the nuclear disarmament of the Baltic Sea.

There is reason to note that in recent reports and public debates in the various Nordic countries much attention has been devoted to military development on the Kola Peninsula and in northern sea areas. In this connection Norway, for its part, has emphasized that in its opinion this development is primarily related to the strategic posturing of the superpowers and does not mean a threat aimed at Norway. The determination of Norway's attitude naturally takes that country's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization into consideration. It is, however, very important that Norway has also declared that it will continue to carry out a policy of detente and as far as possible try to dampen military competition in the vicinity of Norway.

The animated debate and clarification work in the various Nordic countries together with global security developments will provide a stimulus for activities in the near future. Positive results at the Stockholm Conference correspond, to a great degree, with the aspirations of Finland and even other CSCE states as well as with the expectations of their citizens. However, this is not enough. In Finland it must be emphasized that Northern European security will even in the future require vigilance and a readiness to increase trust on an areawide basis.

We are placing great hopes on the next phase of the Stockholm Conference dealing with measures to increase trust and security in Europe as well as with disarmament. The intent is to agree on an agenda at the follow-up meeting of CSCE states commencing in the beginning of November in Vienna. Finland will strive to have the conference deal with actual questions on arms reduction at the earliest possible date.

As I mentioned earlier, more and more attention is being directed at the seas in the Nordic area and its vicinity. Greater fleet strengths and accompanying aircraft are being deployed on them, and ever larger military exercises are being arranged. Ships and aircraft carrying cruise missiles are moving about the seas and in their airspace. Submarine sightings have caused concern especially in Sweden. My conclusion is that in the Nordic countries, in particular, primary consideration should be given to actions that will increase trust in relation to sea areas and their airspace as well as fleet operations.

The premises for developing actions to increase trust directed at fleet operations and sea areas already exist. In 1972 the Soviet Union and the United States concluded a mutual agreement for the purpose of preventing conflicts on the seas. An extension of this arrangement to include the warships of other countries would be natural. The naval arms race has been debated and measures to increase trust on the seas have been subjected to a preliminary deliberation at the United Nations.

Measures for increasing trust on the seas have so far not been debated in the first phase of the conference in Stockholm dealing with measures to increase trust and security in Europe as well as disarmament. They will be brought up again at the conference. The Law-of-the-Seas conferences sponsored by the United Nations have shown how tenaciously countries hang on to their own interests and rights in sea areas. Now, however, the situation has arisen in which more room should be made in the concept of freedom of the seas for measures promoting common security. Measures increasing trust in the North Atlantic and the Arctic Ocean, in particular, would be in the interest of the security of all parties -- the Nordic nations also. Getting some kind of start on controlling the race between submarines equipped with strategic nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and the search and defense against submarines, on the other, would be an exceptionally difficult but important objective. The aspiration should be to recommend restraint in the execution of naval and land warfare exercises and in the final count an attempt should be made to restrain the naval arms race.

Finally, there is reason to note that the recent military interest in sea areas has not at all prevented the advancement of economic interaction in the northern latitudes. Proof of this can be found in, among other things, the many commercial projects which when accomplished will increase cooperation between the USSR, Norway, and Finland, in particular. I believe that even these endeavors will strengthen trust in maintaining the Nordic area's stable situation.

#### "Security Will Not Be Increased by Promoting Armed Force"

I have taken the recent reports on Northern European security as the premise for my speech. Since their approach to an examination of issues is frequently military, my speech has also acquired a military policy coloring. This does not at all mean that the danger of an armed conflict has increased in Northern Europe. It is rather a question of a reflection of changes in the development and weapons technology of the superpowers in our immediate area.

Just as the armament processes are of a continuing and long-term nature, the preparation of security policy reports will also take time. Opinions on factors affecting security change slowly and military doctrines frequently trail behind development. Today security will not be increased by promoting armed force as much as by seeking political solutions to conflicts.

The building of security requires time and patience. It took more than 18 years after Urho Kekkonen presented his proposal of a Nordic nuclear-free zone from this same Paasikivi Society forum before the foreign ministers of the Nordic countries officially discussed this issue for the first time. Years of preparation went into the CSCE and now follow-up meetings have been held for 11 years. Results are being produced all the time, not by dramatic leaps, but as a consequence of patient work.

It is clear that the last words I read were written before last weekend when a dramatic leap occurred. Bernard Shaw says that the world cannot be changed; any sensible person knows this. But then there are people who do not know this and do change the world.

After the meeting of superpower leaders held last weekend in Reykjavik one can justifiably state that something very important has happened, surprisingly to many. The situation in the talks to limit arms has fundamentally changed. There is no return to the time preceding the meeting. Indeed, important decisions were almost made since it was only the question of the United States' strategic defense initiative, the so-called star wars program, that remained open. When one considers the obstacles that were overcome in Reykjavik before this final stumbling block, an acceptable solution cannot help but be found to the final remaining question.

It is important that talks be continued, that there be a readiness for moderation during such talks, and that there be a belief that a more secure world can be built through mutual efforts.

#### Main Points of Proposal

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 16 Oct 86 p 3

[Article: "President Proposed in Paasikivi Society That Nordic Countries Consider Security of Surrounding Seas"]

[Text] Koivisto hoped for restraint in naval exercises and emphasized the central importance of the YYA Pact.

On Wednesday President Mauno Koivisto proposed that the Nordic countries begin to find means which would increase trust in the seas surrounding the Nordic area.

Koivisto justified the proposal made at the Paasikivi Society by the fact that military activity has increased in the neighboring seas. This does not necessarily mean that tension or the danger of war has increased in Northern Europe, he said.

According to Koivisto, the reinforcement of trust would be the most important consideration in the North Atlantic and the Arctic Ocean. He also referred to the fact that submarine sightings have aroused concern especially in Sweden.

Without going into greater detail the President hoped that naval and land warfare exercises would be conducted in a restrained manner in the seas of the Nordic area. In addition, Koivisto recommended that breaks be applied to the race between strategic submarines and the search and defense against them.

Koivisto mentioned the agreement for preventing conflicts at sea as an example of measures for increasing trust. He recommended that the treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States be used as a model for the rest of the world.

Koivisto confirmed that Finland's previous proposals for the establishment of a Nordic nuclear-free zone, the border peace between Finland and Norway, and the ban on long-range cruise missiles are still in effect.

In no uncertain terms President Koivisto emphasized the central importance of the YYA Pact from the point of view of Finland's security. Finland must ensure its defense capability even though resources are not sufficient to provide a defense against all possible crises, he said.

The President's speech is published in its entirety on page 7.

#### Redirect Nordic Attention

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 16 Oct 86 p 2

[Editorial: "Nordic Attention to Measures for Increasing Trust"]

[Text] When attending a meeting of the Paasikivi Society for the first time as president 4 years ago Mauno Koivisto made it clear that he considers that the management of foreign policy is one of the most important prerogatives of the president. After delivering policy speeches in the initial phase of his term Koivisto has, however, been satisfied with a rather low profile in foreign policy speeches also.

Therefore, the President's recent speech at the Paasikivi Society was awaited with interest; indeed, its subject was the security policy situation of the Nordic area. The President's speech did not, however, contain anything dramatically new, but it did point out the direction of emphasis in foreign policy activism in the coming years on behalf of Nordic security.

The significant increase in military activities of the superpowers in the vicinity of the Nordic area, particularly in the surrounding seas, has been emphasized in recent security policy reports in the other Nordic countries. It is considered that it can easily increase tensions and in the worst case endanger the basic security policy situation in the Nordic area.

In Norway concern has been expressed particularly with respect to the growth of Soviet power on the Kola Peninsula and in the northern seas. In Soviet

assessments NATO and the growth of U.S. naval power in the area, for its part, has been seen as the factor endangering stable conditions.

President Koivisto has also previously expressed his concern about developments. However, this time he proceeded from the idea that the situation, in fact, is not necessarily as bad as it appears. The basic situation is as before and the superpowers do not seem to have a desire to change it.

The affirmation of this circumstance is, indeed, part of Nordic liturgy even though profound concern has been hidden under the surface. Certainly, this concern has not escaped even Koivisto. It is, however, in the interest of the Nordic countries to restrain the confrontational posturing of the superpowers and to seek means for exerting an influence that will serve this purpose.

The plan for a Nordic nuclear-free zone seems to be one of those eternal questions. It will not be advanced without the cooperation of both superpowers. Therefore, new kinds of initiative are being sought in Finland. Various means of increasing trust represent one way.

In the Nordic area the attention of the superpowers is being increasingly directed at the seas and their airspace. In Koivisto's opinion Finland and the other Nordic countries should endeavor to promote measures that will increase trust in the sea areas, in particular.

As examples the President mentioned control of the race between strategic nuclear-equipped submarines, on the one hand, and the search and defense against them, on the other, as well as restraint in the execution of naval and land warfare exercises. Joint Nordic initiatives have a good chance of success in these questions since the Norwegian Government is also interested in the matter other than as a nuclear-free zone.

The President's proposals are not exactly new. Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen has previously talked about the same issues. Since the success of the Stockholm Conference, it has, however, become more timely to direct attention toward concrete measures to increase trust and security in Northern Europe.

#### Analyses by Other Papers

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 18 Oct 86 p 13

[Article: "Other Papers"]

[Text] A Noteworthy Policy

Friday's newspapers carried extensive editorial comments on the speech delivered by President Mauno Koivisto on Wednesday at the Paasikivi Society.

The independent bourgeois UUSI SUOMI writes that the speech represented a noteworthy security policy statement, in which timely factors presenting a threat to Northern Europe were assessed and a concrete proposal for alleviating them was made.

According to the paper, the timing and the subject of the speech were carefully considered. Consideration was also given to the form of the speech, which leaves room for bilateral as well as joint Nordic initiatives, for example.

"From the point of view of the future it is important that Koivisto's initiative for building trust does not remain an individual expression of opinion, but that long-term and initiatory work will be built on its basis in Finnish foreign policy for stabilizing the situation in the Nordic area."

#### A New Kind of Opening

The independent TURUN SANOMAT considers the President's proposal to be a new kind of opening, according to which the Nordic countries should jointly deliberate measures for increasing trust in relation to sea areas, their airspace, and fleet operations.

According to the paper, the President's proposal is an emphatically political proposal, in which he presents neighboring countries with the challenge of a joint initiative. Such initiative could be accomplished either as a part of the CSCE process or in the forums of the UN. At the same time, the President, in fact, outlined a mandate for the future work of the CSCE, writes the paper.

According to TURUN SANOMAT, there is reason to assume that the proposal will be received positively in the Nordic countries. Norway, which opposes the idea of a nuclear-free zone, may also support it.

"Without mentioning Norway by name Koivisto points out that the formation of a nuclear-free zone is not a simple matter. In emphasizing the importance of the collaboration of the nuclear powers, he makes a concession to the view that a Nordic nuclear-free zone can be accomplished only as a part of a broader European security arrangement."

#### Defense Has Important Task

According to AAMULEHTI (Conservative Party), the President's speech contained the elements of a foreign policy statement. At its basis was distress over the growing strategic importance of the surrounding seas. On the other hand, in the background was satisfaction with the results achieved at the conclusion of the first phase of the Stockholm Conference.

The desire to bring up actions increasing trust on the seas at the follow-up meeting of CSCE and at the next phase of the Stockholm Conference is representative of initiative, writes AAMULEHTI.

"It can also be concluded from the President's policy speech that Finland's own national defense will be faced with an important and realistic task. A conflict between the East and the West, improbable in itself, would not be directly aimed at Finland, but it would affect us. It is in just such a situation that an effective defense establishment will be able to protect our territorial integrity."

### Work Must Begin Without Delay

According to SUOMEN SOSIALIDEMOKRAATTI, the President's speech was so far the most significant security policy statement of his presidency. The policy line outlined by Koivisto is aimed at building trust and limiting the arms race. According to the paper, Koivisto has raised the question of now extending measures for increasing trust and security to the seas on the eve of his trip to Stockholm and the follow-up meeting of the CSCE in Vienna.

"The atmosphere for a relevant treatment of the ideas presented by Koivisto is significantly riper today than, for example, when Kekkonen presented his initiative for establishing a Nordic nuclear-free zone. However, we must be prepared for the fact that the accomplishment of concrete results will take time. There is, indeed, reason to begin work without delay."

### A Tree Has Grown from A Seed

Editor-in-Chief Jan-Magnus Jansson of HUFVUDSTADSBLADET writes that as Koivisto's political proposal on activities on the seas is being evaluated, it is noteworthy that the President did not directly mention naval disarmament. The subject of the proposal was more modest. The President extends measures for increasing trust to naval activities. As the Stockholm negotiations demonstrate, the area is not easily controlled, writes Jansson.

According to Jansson, Koivisto's speech contained a strong Nordic point of view and it is, therefore, interesting to see what the reaction to his proposals will be in the Nordic countries.

"Certain general interesting arguments in the speech cannot be ignored. For example, Koivisto's reflections that 'he who wants to make certain of everything does not make certain of anything' or 'today security will not be increased by promoting armed force as much as by seeking political solutions to conflicts'. Are these self-evident truths? No, but rather they are a reflection of Finland's foreign policy with its special experiences taken to the highest level of life's philosophy. From the seed which Paasikivi planted a large tree has grown."

### Norwegian, Swedish, U.S. Context

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 28 Oct 86 p 2

[Editorial: "Competition in Nordic Sea Area A Common Concern of Nordic Countries"]

[Text] The President of the Republic delivered a speech on Northern European security, which was already in advance called a policy speech, 2 weeks ago at the Paasikivi Society. Instead of explicit policy lines, Koivisto composed what he had to say rather ambiguously in places, which has resulted in some rather different interpretations of the role of the Defense Forces, for example. In spite of this, the speech contained many new ideas from the point of

view of Finnish foreign policy, especially the directing of attention toward measures for increasing trust in Nordic sea areas.

Koivisto's ideas have not been seen as rather new openings in the other Nordic countries. Little attention should not be interpreted as a negative reaction. On the contrary, there seems to be a good foundation for joint diplomatic activity, when its time comes.

Our opportunities for action in the promotion of a Nordic nuclear-free zone, as is well known, have turned out to be very few because of the negative attitude of Norway and Denmark as well as in the final count of all of NATO. The Nordic countries cannot do much for a matter in which both superpowers have adopted a completely different policy.

Thus Koivisto is seeking new alternatives for a fruitless activity, which has only resulted in loggerheads with Norway. He is turning his attention toward a question in which Norway also has its own concern. It is the growing naval and air activities of both superpowers -- indeed, primarily the Soviet Union's from Norway's point of view -- in the northern sea areas.

In a zone report made public by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry a year ago it states, for example: "It is in the interest of Norway and the Nordic countries to supplement a possible zone arrangement by actions which would mutually limit military activity in sea areas and airspace outside of the zone states."

Norwegian Defense Minister Johan Jorgen Holst was by no means appearing for the first time when immediately after Koivisto's speech he coincidentally demanded that measures for increasing trust in the CSCE also be extended to naval and land warfare exercises being conducted in northern sea areas. Therefore, the same demand proposed by Koivisto was nothing new for the Norwegians.

Koivisto's ideas were also not new to Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson, who last week confirmed in vague terms that he is thinking along the same lines as Koivisto. Indeed, it has been said in Sweden that things were put in motion there before they were in Finland. Attempts have been made to promote the limitation of the naval arms race by Swedish initiative primarily at the UN.

Koivisto, however, tied the matter to the CSCE and the negotiations conducted at the Stockholm Conference on actions for increasing trust. This, without a doubt, also suits Sweden. Indeed, Koivisto made reference in an understanding manner to the concern caused by submarine sightings in Sweden even though a few days later in Sweden his personal attitude toward them was one of skepticism.

Koivisto received a natural opportunity to express his ideas directly to the other superpower also when U.S. Armed Forces Commander William Crowe arrived last week on an official visit. Admiral Crowe did not want to talk about an increase in tension in northern sea areas and neither did Koivisto. The foreign policy leadership was probably grateful that Crowe declared himself to be "unqualified" to make any statements on Sweden's submarine sightings.

POLITICAL

NETHERLANDS

DE VRIES ON RELATIONS WITH LUBBERS, CABINET, KOK

Amsterdam DE TIJD in Dutch 17 Oct 86 pp 8-12

[Interview with Party-Group Leader Bert De Vries by Gerard Driehuis and Tom-Jan Meeus; date and place not given]

[Text] More self-assured than ever before, he gave House members a scare last week; or was it nothing more than a tactical maneuver? An interview with Bert De Vries, chairman of the [House] party-group. Why Lubbers is not the boss, his vision of the cabinet too "narrow-minded," why Wim Kok is being ignored and why Ruding is always backed up, no matter what goes wrong. And to the reporters: "It is just as in your own profession: We thrive less by vision than by division!"

One thing happened right after the other: Before the elections he let the party leaders know that he wanted to conduct the negotiations himself in the name of the CDA, at the time of cabinet selection. He could do that better than Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers.

Not long after the elections, Vice Party-Group Chairman Huib Eversdijk, at the request of De Vries, wrote a piece in CHRISTEN-DEMOCRATISCHE VERKENNINGEN, in which he made it clear that the image of the CDA is best reflected not by Lubbers alone, but by the entire House party-group.

Again not long after that, he made it clear in an interview in the daily, HET BINNENHOF, that he was no one's "servant," and thus not Lubbers' either.

And again, soon afterward, last week in fact, at the general deliberations in the House, he came out with a steady flow of criticism. Against Ruding, but also (to a certain extent) against Lubbers and De Koning.

So something is happening to Bert De Vries, the House party-group chairman of the CDA. He has come out of his shell, he reflects greater self-assurance, he is no longer Lubbers' servant, but a man with his own point of view. And he has 54 House representatives behind him.

How differently things sometimes turn out! Four years ago he was elected House party-group chairman, as the "least evil" of all the candidates at that time, with a political background that went no farther than the back benches of the

House. His career had got off to a rocky start with a great deal of discord in his own ranks (Stef & I), and for a long time thereafter he was snowed under by the verbal violence of Nijpels, but already by the end of the last cabinet term, people within--and outside of--the CDA began to observe that De Vries had his own personality that surfaced from time to time. Lubbers had gotten a partner rather than a subject.

This trend seems to be continuing. What were we able to note down last week? Ruding is letting himself become too involved in money matters. De Koning must do more to combat unemployment. Van Dijk did not act "wisely" in uttering the statements he made about government office-holders, and on the whole the cabinet lacks vision regarding the society of the future. For those who do not follow the course of domestic politics closely day by day, this may not sound sensational, but things are different at the Binnenhof [parliament], where De Vries' words gave many a government official quite a turn last week.

Does De Vries really mean what he says? Does he perhaps want to become the new CDA boss? Or does he only want to improve the social image of the CDA?

[Question] Should any doubt be permitted to exist on the question of who is boss in the CDA?

[Answer] We have no boss in the CDA.

[Question] No one is the boss?

[Answer] We have a minister-president who has a very great responsibility to this nation, we have a party-group chairman who also has some responsibility, and up to a short time ago we had a party chairman who had some responsibility. And as a trio we try to function with some degree of rationality.

[Question] At the general deliberations last week, was something afoot? Your tone was different and your criticism harsher than, say, three years ago.

[Answer] That I don't know.

[Question] All the reporters thought so.

[Answer] That was simply the perception the press got.

[Question] Well, they haven't all gone crazy, have they?

[Answer] (hesitating) Now you must not completely rule out that possibility. (winding down a bout of laughter) No, such things you must never rule out.

[Question] If you say that no one is boss in the CDA, then is Lubbers not the boss, either?

[Answer] No, but then again, this has never been the case, or rather it was never put in such terms in the CDA. We never said that the minister-president from his Torentje [official residence of the prime minister] controls the be-

havior of the party-group or the party. And although certain observers have continued to say that that is not the way it was in recent years, this is their own point of view, of course.

All Right, Huib

[Question] In the past, were you consciously trying to send out signals that the party-group was not so flexible?

[Answer] No different from the past.

[Question] Yet recently, since the installation of the cabinet, you have made a number of surprising statements and authorized others concerning your position in the party. In the journal HET BINNENHOF you said that you were not "Lubbers' servant." You would not say such a thing if it were not completely clear to everyone that such is precisely the situation, right?

[Answer] Yes, but if you had read that article in HET BINNENHOF and not just the headline, then you would have seen that it said: "It is not true that one is the servant of the other." That is in complete agreement with what I just said to you.

[Question] That makes sense, but the article also made it clear that it was you who asked Vice Party-Group Chairman Huib Eversdijk to write up the story in CHRISTEN-DEMOCRATISCHE VERKENNINGEN, in which he stated that it is the party-group rather than Lubbers, that represents the real personality and image of the CDA. How can you explain this?

[Answer] Well, this summer during the cabinet-selection period, I was requested to write the article, but I didn't have the time. So I asked Eversdijk: "Huib, are you willing to write up that story for CHRISTEN-DEMOCRATISCHE VERKENNINGEN and to make a useful contribution out of it?" for I did have a number of other things to do. He was nice enough to ask me what I thought about his piece before he submitted it for publication. Well, I didn't find any obscene language in it, so I said: "All right, Huib; go ahead with it."

[Question] Did you agree with the tenor of his article?

[Answer] Yes, look, everyone selects his own wordings. There were a number of sentences with which I had no difficulty and others that simply didn't mean very much to me. I had no objections to its contents. Nor do I think that the article makes a pitch for new forms of dualism. I read nothing of that sort in it. I also prefer to speak of a situation in which everyone has his individual responsibility to work together with others, on the basis of that responsibility.

[Question] But it looked for the moment, last week, as if Eversdijk's article was also having an impact on the stance you and your party-group had adopted in the House.

[Answer] It may very well have. In the House it would be fine if it became apparent that Lubbers and I have different kinds of responsibility.

No CDA Voice

[Question] There was much more dualism than a few years ago. Until the election, in fact, for then you joined the fold again.

[Answer] No. If you read carefully the input I made in the House deliberations of last week, you will see that my reservations on the budget had to do with the question of the direction the country should take after 1990 and not with the policy for 1987. What kind of society do we want to create? How much government should there be? Do we consider government services as so much dead weight on the shoulders of industry? I think not. When I hear Joris Voorhoeve speak on this subject, for example, I say: That is a direction in which I do not wish to go. And then again, when I look at the budget, I say: Things are going too far in that direction as well. And I want to make that objection publicly.

[Question] Do you feel that the CDA lacks a voice in the budget deliberations?

[Answer] The fact that I made a point of it indicates that it did rub me the wrong way.

[Question] You found too much VVD viewpoint in it?

[Answer] Tack on whatever labels you wish. What I said was: This discussion is aimed at putting everyone back on the right track; and as a Christian Democrat I find myself unqualified for this type of approach, which I deem far too narrow-minded.

Ed Nijpels

[Question] Given the things you are now saying, it was probably not all that illogical for Mr Voorhoeve to remain seated for the most part, during the debate. How do you like his cooperation, by the way?

[Answer] I get along very well with Voorhoeve.

[Question] Better than with Nijpels?

[Answer] Let me say that my collaboration with Nijpels got off to a rather difficult start, but after two, three or four years, when we knew each other better . . .

[Question] . . . then he had already got burned!

[Answer] . . . we knew what to expect from one another. (laughing) Then things went along just as in a modern cohabitation arrangement. We knew what we had in one another, and we lived with each other. And in the long run it all worked out rather well, you know. I must say on that score that I have the fondest of memories of the cabinet formation negotiations with Ed Nijpels.

[Question] He had to spend a great deal of time on other things at the time the cabinet was being formed. You mean that he was left out of the picture?

[Answer] No, no, no! No! It is not true that he was left out of the picture. Certainly not. Voorhoeve is new. That means that we have to get used to each other. But I do believe that he is turning out all right.

[Question] You both get together each week?

[Answer] Yes, and that is going as well as can be desired.

[Question] The vision the Christian Democrats have of society comes back again every time, for you often manifest a difference of opinion on that score. What could be the reason?

[Answer] One of our crucial concerns is that the government not have too many pretensions. That has met with quite a lot of criticism, but when I see the kind of developmental thinking being done by leftist propagandists like Flip De Kam, then I think, "Did we not pass through that stage ourselves earlier?" Of course one must not say this too loudly, for otherwise that line of thinking will collapse immediately; so I let matters take their own course, but if someone says: How vague and unclear the Christian Democrats are, my answer is: Flip De Kam is now taking over the concepts that we were surfacing a few years ago; he sticks the "leftist" label on them and suddenly everything passes muster.

[Question] What did you think of the way Lubbers presented the situation at last week's debate on his policy?

[Answer] That story originated from a longer one that he had related a few days earlier in Bruges. And I must honestly say that I have not yet had a chance to read it.

[Question] He gave a succinct overview in the House.

[Answer] Yes, but because of the din of voices that day in the House, I did not listen to it very carefully. But there were certain remarks that did appeal to me.

[Question] He made a reference to the "richest poor people and the poorest rich people," spoke out against discrimination, that sort of thing--the word Christianity entered in to his remarks once, as a kind of afterthought.

[Answer] But after all, he was there as minister president of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and not as the number-one man on the CDA list of election candidates.

#### Only Divisions

[Question] One other thing: At such times of general deliberation, you give a basic talk on how the world and the Netherlands will fare in the future, and the only thing the newspapers print is the small talk, the quarrels, the question of your liking or disliking Wim Kok. Isn't that frustrating?

[Answer] That is something I've had to get accustomed to in recent years. Sometimes I try to give a basic talk, but the press is interested only in our

divisions. The media hardly ever get into the rest of it. You think things out, you try to come up with new concepts, but none of it reaches anyone. If a basic vision emerges, no one is listening.

[Question] When Lubbers conceives a basic vision, you don't seem to listen, either.

[Answer] There was a considerable hubbub the day Lubbers spoke for the second time. Now there are other concerns in the House, and that is a fact. But look, the prime minister and number-one man of the CDA lets his light shine on a few fundamental facts, and the party-group leader relaxes his attention for a moment. This is perhaps a bit careless on his part. (Suddenly Bert De Vries has the solution. He says beaming): It is very much like your own profession, in fact: We live more by divisions than by visions.

[Question] The opposition leader--the new one--is also involved in the thinking process and is trying to come up with alternatives. Working with Kok is different from working with Den Uyl. Kok wants to cooperate, yet he is totally ignored subsequently--by the VVD, by Lubbers and by you.

[Answer] He just thinks he is being ignored. He must understand that he has to take into account the reality of the coalition agreement. If you don't do that, then you must not have too high an expectation of getting a hearing. Kok presented it very nicely, but he didn't want anything, or hardly anything [that the other parties wanted]. He wanted no cutbacks in education, no cutbacks in the area of sociocultural work, no freeze on benefit payments or government salaries, none of these. And subsequently all the favorite hobby horses of Den Uyl were again trotted out of their stable. The taxes had to be raised again, all incomes had to be raised, the old story all over again.

The tone is nicer than with Den Uyl, but the content is still the same.

[Question] You don't suspect that the collaboration between the CDA and the PvdA is becoming more pleasant than when Den Uyl was still in power?

[Answer] I have not yet totally relinquished that hope.

[Question] But the hope is slight?

[Answer] Kok is not looking for a fight, but he has apparently not yet figured out a way to avoid the conflict, either. (with unwonted display of humor): Perhaps he would have to discover that the policy of taking small steps is more productive than that of risking great failures.

[Question] Kok reproaches the cabinet and the CDA for having promised an open dialog, whereas in fact nothing of the sort ever happened.

[Answer] His "open dialog" means that we must swallow more or less half of the coalition agreement. That does not look too realistic to me. Kok would want us to consult the employers and employees as if there were no coalition agreement: "Everything is open to discussion." That is nonsense, of course. On our part we don't ask the PvdA to forget about its election program, do we?

[Question] The PvdA does endorse the government goal concerning retrenchments and the reduction of the deficit. That is wonderful, isn't it?

[Answer] Yes and no. Kok is of one mind with us regarding deficit reduction, but not by means of retrenchment. It must come almost entirely from increased premiums and higher taxes. That story we already knew.

Disagreeable to Ruding

[Question] Retrenchments make one think of H. Onno Ruding. Let us once again bring up that fine drama. Would you want to drop him? You were so disagreeable to him at the time of the general deliberations.

[Answer] In politics you have to separate the issues from the people.

[Question] Do you always do that? You said that you were attacking the job-opportunities policy, but you directed your attack against Ruding. He isn't responsible for that. It happens to be another minister: Jan De Koning.

[Answer] I directed my attack against the budget. That is a central policy issue, and so I directed my attack against the entire cabinet. But I also spoke about combatting unemployment.

[Question] Was that not directed against Ruding?

[Answer] No, it was not directed against Ruding alone. It targeted the entire cabinet.

[Question] Hence Lubbers as well?

[Answer] Yes, Lubbers as well.

[Question] Nevertheless, you made it seem as if you had something against Ruding.

[Answer] That would suit you all very well, but I deliberately broadened my criticism during the debate. It was a bit frustrating that no one noticed that. They say I was critical of Ruding. I reply that I am critical of the cabinet policy as a whole.

[Question] Ruding wasn't very impressed by what you had said. He answered you in a few sentences, and as for the rest, you were left to your own devices.

[Answer] I thought that that was rather prudent. It was not such a good idea for us both to keep standing at the interruption microphone.

[Question] We would have rather liked that.

[Answer] That was why we didn't do it.

[Question] It wouldn't have mattered, he was going to leave anyway. At least, that seemed to be the foregone conclusion.

[Answer] That is all the more reason to speak courteously to someone. You get frustrated only if you have not yet taken leave of someone. (We spoke to De Vries Monday when the European Ministers' Council had decided to defer their decision for a while.)

[Question] If Ruding does not get appointed, may he then remain a cabinet minister?

[Answer] What an odd question! Why on earth not? He is one of the two persons deemed fit for one of the highest financial positions in the world. If the other man is appointed, then he may of course remain as minister.

(We must have looked pensive, for De Vries explained a bit further): Look, if he had presented himself as candidate for chairman--I just toss this out as an example--of the council of administration of the Amro Bank, then I would have said: Begone! That is impossible to accomplish so easily. But this we have to allow. It is in the best interests of the nation.

[Question] How so?

[Answer] As a nation, wouldn't we have a much better "in" with the IMF if Ruding were sitting on its board of trustees? That was true when Van Lennep sat on the board of the OECD, and when Luns was at NATO. If you came to NATO as a Dutch politician, then you would speak differently to Luns--whatever you may think of him yourself--than you would to Carrington.

Gap

(We must have looked somewhat incredulous on the subject of Ruding and his involvement with world hunger. Therefore we were treated at once to a presentation dealing with all the other important IMF matters. The feeling that in this he was making an effort to transfer a problem case to Washington would not quite go away.)

[Question] Given your criticism of Ruding last week, do you feel the need for another type of finance minister?

[Answer] A minister of finance must do two things: Look after the image the Netherlands presents to the world, and control the exchequer. Ruding was and is first-rate in both those domains, but presenting the entire cabinet policy to the world is perhaps not the primary task of a minister of finance.

[Question] Finances are ideology, too, of course. How much government do you want; what, in fact, do you want to do and what not to do?

[Answer] Certainly, but the fact that the margins are narrow is also important here. What I want and what Ruding wants seem to be two quite different things in practice. But the gap between Onno and me is perhaps not as wide as it looks. And for the period up to 1990 we have both signed the coalition agreement.

[Question] Have you any idea who might eventually succeed Ruding?

[Answer] Yes, indeed.

[Question] And could we possibly be told that person's name?

[Answer] Now you are going a bit too far. We have to wait and see how things go.

(The party-group leader looks at the interviewers with joviality and self-assurance. There is no hint of a doubt on his face. Bert De Vries, the party-group leader and no longer the errand-boy. Would Lubbers really be happy about that?)

8117  
CSO: 3614/13

POLITICAL

SPAIN

**FINANCING, ADMINISTRATION OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION DETAILED**

Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish 27 Oct 86 pp 34-38

[Article by Santiago Aroca: "Government Spends 2,200 Million on Bonuses and Spies"; first paragraph is TIEMPO introduction]

**Text**] Three ministries--Interior, Defense, and Foreign Affairs--will divide up 2,200 million pesetas among themselves in 1987, in the form of "reserve funds" to buy intelligence, pay bonuses to high-echelon officials, and finance top secret projects. This money is appropriated under their General Expense Budgets, but its disbursement is not subject to parliamentary audit nor to audit by the Ministry of Finance. Spain has the Western world's highest ratio of reserve funds per capita.

Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, and Deputy Prime Minister Alfonso Guerra do not have reserve funds. Both shun this rubric and prefer that money be budgeted to them for "protocolary courtesies and attendance at meetings." The financing of intelligence, the carrying out of confidential projects and the distribution of bonuses among high-echelon officials of the Administration has been left in the hands of three ministries: Interior, Defense, and Foreign Affairs.

The Minister of Interior will be able to spend 819,241,000 pesetas in the form of 1987 reserve funds. That is, Minister Barriomuevo and his inner circle will be able to spend 100,000 pesetas per hour each and every day of the year. Within the Interior Ministry, the major portion of the reserve expenditures--579,418,000 pesetas--is allocated to the State Security Directorate. The man who accounts directly for this money is Luis Bernaldo de Quiros Fernandez, a relatively unknown personage among politicians and reporters.

Luis Bernaldo de Quiros lives a very orderly life. Every morning he is picked up at his home in an official car, a Seat 131, with license plate M-3029-EK. Luis Bernaldo de Quiros does not leave the vestibule of his residence until his chauffeur, a policeman, indicates to him that there is no danger. When he enters the Interior Ministry, he uses the elevator reserved for high-echelon officials, greets the ushers who are awaiting him and who include two recently hired daughters of his chauffeur, and proceeds to his luxurious office, located on the first floor, in the ante-chamber of the office of the director of state security, Julian Sancristobal.

Prior to October 1982, the date on which the PSOE, for the first time, won the general elections, Luis Bernaldo de Quiros was an employee of the Pescanova firm. In addition, to supplement his income, he maintained a legal consulting office to which he devoted several hours every evening. At the time of the 1982 elections, Luis Bernaldo de Quiros had been married several years to the sister of Rafael Vera Fernandez-Huidobro, present undersecretary of interior. This family relationship provided sufficient guarantee for Rafael Vera.

Working with Luis Bernaldo de Quiros, and attached to the Ministry under a work contract since October 1982, is Juan Alberto Minguez Alvarez, a policeman recently promoted to the grade of deputy inspector. This official is the one who, on a personal basis, disburses the money used for payments that require no justification. His desk is located in front of a large metal enclosure which conceals a safe. That safe, protected recently by a movie camera equipped for infrared photography so as to be able to film in the dark, always contains several million pesetas. When the money runs low, Juan Alberto Minguez climbs into one of the Peugeot vehicles of the State Security Directorates motor pool and heads for the Banco de Espana to withdraw more funds.

#### With Receipts

Juan Alberto Minguez is 44 years of age, a native of Segovia, and enjoys certain privileges, such as that of a parking space in a private parking lot, paid for by the Ministry so that he can ride to work in his own vehicle. Within the bounds of secrecy, this official keeps a simple, straightforward accounting, and for that purpose requires a signed receipt for all the money he disburses, a receipt he himself draws up.

The receipts are notes without official letterheads, in which the person who receives the money is identified only by a pseudonym. Deputy Inspector Minguez enjoys the full confidence of his present superiors and has behind him extensive experience, in that he performed the same functions under the UCD governments. Following the Socialist victory in 1982, Juan Alberto Minguez joined the PSOE chapter of Madrid's Tetuan District.

A part of the Interior Ministry's reserve fund is used to pay for confidential information and for the procurement of sophisticated security equipment. However, most of those funds are spent on bonuses, known within the Administration by the nickname "bufandas" ["sweeteners"], paid to the civil service employees who work in the "cupola" of the Ministry. Twenty-five million pesetas are distributed every month in this fashion.

In the Directorate for State Security, for example, Juan Alberto Minguez delivers, on the first day of each month, an envelope containing money to each one of the civil service employees assigned to that department. Police inspectors, officials of the Civil Guard, and upper echelon officials receive 100,000 pesetas extra each month; middle-echelon employees, 40,000 pesetas; and chauffeurs and ushers, 20,000 pesetas.

In the office of Minister Barrionuevo, his secretary, Jose Parralejo Agudo, performs a similar function. Jose Parralejo, a member of the Socialist chapter of Alcorcon (Madrid), manages the secret funds reserved by the minister and Rafael Vera, undersecretary. During 1987, these officials will have at their disposal 181,441,000 pesetas. A good part of this money will go to pay the costs stemming from the confinement of "etarras" in South American and African countries. During 1986, these costs will amount to 134 million pesetas. Secret trips by Rafael Vera to Third World countries, where it is planned to send more terrorists, have been budgeted for in the amount of 20 million pesetas.

The publicity being waged by the Ministry of Interior to stem terrorism is costly. Seventy million pesetas are to be spent on it this year. An additional 15 million pesetas, also out of reserve funds, were spent to publish 100,000 copies of a book titled "La policia y la Constitucion espanola" [The Police and the Spanish Constitution], which were never distributed because Minister Barrionuevo did not like the content of the book. Still another 10 million pesetas out of the Interior Ministry's reserve funds were turned over to certain police unions, which evidently may have contributed to a reduction of union conflicts.

#### Informants

The Ministry of Interior spends 300 million pesetas annually on informants and the buying of information. Inspector Francisco Alvarez and Jesus Martinez Torres, head of the General Inspectorate of Intelligence are allocated the major part of this money. Inspector Alberto Elias, the head of the police who gathered information on the parties in the parliamentary opposition, has received 25 million pesetas this year to pay his informants.

The director general of the Civil Guard, Jose Antonio Saenz de Santa Maria, controls 58,382,000 pesetas, a sum that is administered by one of his private secretaries, Col Ausibio Cabrero Montoro. This officer began his career fighting against the Communist Maquis in the 1940's. Upon taking charge of the administration of reserve funds in 1984, he had to leave his position in the directorate of the Benemerita disciplinary department.

During the first 10 months of 1986, the Civil Guard Directorate has spent 21 million pesetas out of reserve funds on the tracking of the clandestine members of SUGC [Unified Union of the Civil Guard]. The tracking of the members of this organization is the function of the unit designated Special Subgroup Number 5, headed by Lt Col Candido Acedo Perez.

This elite unit of the Civil Guard has its masked headquarters in a chalet at Calle de Zacarias Homs, 18 in Madrid. There is where the planning takes place, under the direction of Maj Angel Alba Coca, for special operations by the Civil Guard against the ETA. But, for Jose Antonio Saenz de Santa Maria, the dismemberment of the SUGC is a much more pressing objective, and he has

devoted the best of the Benemerita units to this task. Lt Julian Hernandez del Barco, alias "Arturo," a member of the mentioned Special Subgroup Number 5, has used several million pesetas out of reserve funds to buy listening and recording devices for use in tracking the leaders of the illegal SUGC.

Saenz de Santa Maria also distributes bonuses among the members of his headquarters staff and the members of the special units of the Civil Guard. This year, bonuses paid in addition to salaries will come to some 35 million pesetas.

Although the Ministry of Interior handles a large sum of money free of accountability, it is not the department having the most reserve funds. In Defense, the sum is even greater. In 1987, the Ministry headed by Narcis Serra will have at its disposal 1,259,696,000 pesetas. That is, Defense will be spending 150,000 pesetas hourly throughout the year, free of parliamentary oversight. Of the total sum assigned to Defense, Minister Narcis Serra will have at his personal disposal 309,096,000 pesetas. To this figure must be added another 291,565,000 pesetas allocated to him by the state general expenses budget under the rubrics "protocolary courtesies" and "miscellaneous." In total, the head of Defense will spend 1.5 million pesetas daily without having to justify those expenditures to anyone.

Narcis Serra's reserve funds are administered by two civil servants: Jose Luis Lancho de Leon and Jose Ignacio Moscoso del Prado y del Alamo. With part of the Ministry's funds, Luis Reverter, manager of the information office of the Ministry (DRISDE), pays for analytical studies by defense experts. Narcis Serra distributes generous bonuses, around 200,000 pesetas, to the officials who work in the NATO organizations and in the jointly operated Spanish-U.S. bases.

The military organization that consumes the most money without parliamentary oversight is the CESID [Higher Center for Defense Intelligence], the top espionage and counterespionage body. Following its reorganization, the CESID is receiving 912,740,000 pesetas for undercover work. The principal consumer of this money is Infantry Lt Col Santiago Bastos Norena, director of the CESID's entire interior area. This area is divided into two groups: Involution, whose objective is the tracking of the Extreme Rightist and military "golpista" groups; and Revolution, devoted to terrorists and Extreme Leftist entities. Col Estanislao Urquijo y Ramirez de Haro and Lt Cols Jose Belles Gasulla and Luis Guerrero Carranza, assigned to the area of Interior, have invested 17 million pesetas in tracking, photographing and recording the meetings of Cavalry Col Carlos de Meer de Rivera, who has been tried for having met various times with Qadhafi.

The heads of the CESID's counterespionage area consider that the 175 million pesetas they have received in 1986 are insufficient. Lt Col Manuel Chalud Lillo, in charge of keeping track of the Soviet citizens residing in Spain, distributes 50 million pesetas among his agents for the purchase of

information. A substantial quantity of money, around 200 million pesetas this year, has gone to the Spanish spies concerned with the Islamic nations. Years ago, Infantry Lt Col Gilberto Marquina Lopez, today the military attache of the Spanish Embassy in Algeria, organized a brilliant intelligence service in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. In these countries, the CESID has working with it some 50 or so operatives who send back information of military interest.

The "poor relation" as regards reserve funds is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has received an allocation of 141,400,000 pesetas, a sum that is administered by Santiago Salas Collantes, principal secretary to Francisco Fernandez Ordóñez. Foreign Affairs buys very little information. Generally speaking, its reserve fund is used to supplement the budgetary allocations of its embassies, since many Spanish diplomatic missions use up their budgeted funds extremely rapidly. The second largest source of expenditures is the special and unforeseen trips the minister himself has to make.

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CSO: 3548/16

POLITICAL

SPAIN

AP SECRETARY DISCUSSES STATUS, FUTURE OF PARTY

Madrid EPOCA in Spanish 20 Oct 86 pp 34-42

[Interview with Alberto Ruiz-Gallardon, secretary general of AP [Popular Alliance]: "'I Repeat: There Is No Crisis in Popular Alliance"'; by Pilar Urbano, in Madrid, date not given]

[Text] The elevator carried me to the 7th floor of Genova-Trece [Genova, 13], the top floor, the dome of the decisions and indecisions of what has come to be called the "Opposition Ministry": AP. And I laughed to myself: The last time I made this ascent, Carlos Robles Piquer said to me, "Can you not already sense the smell of power?" This same elevator carried Jorge Verstrynge ("Ferstringue, the scoundrel," according to Fraga) down, with his bundles of documents and his boxes of books and papers. This same elevator carried Alberto Ruiz-Gallardon up, infused with the emotion of the novice about to profess his faith and take his vows in "Unshakable allegiance to the principles that inspire the party and our national leader--ar!" [as published]. Today, in the AP, there is no smell of power. There is the smell-in-the-air of trouble, of tension, of debt, of rout, of the laying off of 71 secretaries, of "Fraga-must-continue-or-we-might-as-well-all-go-to-bed," of circling vultures, of sleeping hawks and waking doves...

In his spacious office, thin and tall as a bean pole, Gallardon ("Gallardin") awaits me, standing behind the desk, his back to a large picture window. Through the windowpane, what a beautiful horizon of clouds! Through the lenses of his glasses, the most searching eyes I have seen in my life. Eyes of a public prosecutor. Eyes of an alert and watchful dove. Eyes of a lad who has studied much and held back many a bitter tear. It is a story that I could not tell and will not tell. Those thick, bushy eyebrows..., like those of Leonid Brezhnev, like those of Luis Carrero Blanco, like those of Jose Maria Ruiz-Gallardon, his illustrious father, impart a trace of excessive virile austerity to his young, "grind-ish"-student-like face.

[Question] Shall we start, Alberto?

[Answer] I am at your disposal. Shoot...

(Instinctively, he grasps a thin gold-plated ballpoint. He is tense and on guard, although smiling.)

[Question] How does it feel...?

[Answer] To be secretary general of Popu...?

[Question] No, no! How does it feel when one jumps into space and his parachute has still not opened?

[Answer] Oh! I wasn't expecting that question! Yes, I am a parachutist. It has been some time since I last jumped. The emotion and the sensation... are inexplicable. I know of nothing to which I could compare them. First, there is the moment of decision: To jump from the plane, to throw yourself out into space. Then, you realize that you are plummeting down..., the parachute hasn't opened and you're not sure it will respond..., you're daring death...! It's an exciting mixture of dread and anxiety... Suddenly, the silk unfurls and an ineffable peace suffuses you... You go from a feeling of nothingness to one of mastery of space... Then, the descent, the marvelous solitude among the clouds, perhaps buffeted by a current of air... Then, you start calculating your landing... You remember everything you've been told: "Your ankles... Be careful of your ankles!"... I have jumped some 70 times, and each jump has seemed to me different and new...

(He has now let go of the gold-plated ballpoint. He has relaxed. It's time now...)

#### 'They've Taken With Them the Core of the Crisis'

[Question] How does "There is no crisis in Popular Alliance" taste? After all, you have had to chew those six words at some length, then swallow them.

[Answer] Well, even though you may consider this obstinate on my part, I repeat: There is no crisis in Popular Alliance. There are some few, some very few, who have indeed left the party, and who have taken some seats with them that are not properly theirs; but they've also taken with them the core of the crisis.

[Question] Is that to say that "nothing has happened here," as in the estate of Donana...?

[Answer] We have here a party of 227,000 members, who run the party, and who agree on the liberal-conservative ideology of a Center-Right that is a zealous defender of freedoms and a custodian of sound principles; who agree also with the political views of a grass-roots party rather than those of a "white-collar" party; and who agree with and cluster like a pine cone around their leader Manuel Fraga.

[Question] Hear! Hear! Let's take it by parts. First: You say "Here, it is the members who run the party." But isn't Fraga "the boss?"

[Answer] It is the members who have entrusted the leadership of the party to Fraga. And they have done this Congress after Congress.

[Question] Would this be putting words into your mouth: "Here, Fraga is an 'errand boy'!"

[Answer] Fraga receives and assumes the job of leading the AP, and he leads it with full authority; but he also holds himself fully disposable.

[Question] Second: How do you know that the grass roots, the 227,000 members, "agree with and cluster like a pine cone" around all those points you have indicated to me? Have you perhaps carried out a referendum?

[Answer] We have very recently traveled, we have talked with the members and their provincial leaders, and the response is unanimous: "We are with Fraga." Or, put also in another way, and I have had to take it as a warning: "I will back you, 'Gallardon,' if you are loyal to Fraga; if not..., don't count on me."

[Question] Third: Every time you call yourselves a liberal-conservative party I am as perplexed by it as when Alzaga's Christian Democrats say they are, at one and the same time, a popular party and a "white-collar" party. One can be one or the other, but not all at the same time.

[Answer] The liberal and the conservative are two distinct inputs which are not incompatible with each other, are complementary, and not mutually preclusive. We are liberals in the realm of political ideas, the defense of civil liberties, and economy of the marketplace. And we are conservative with respect to the human and social values that warrant safekeeping and safeguarding. But we are not conservatives in the manner of one who, passively, inherits an estate or a historic legacy and preserves it as if it were a museum. We conserve by renovating, improving, updating what is truly worthwhile. And in this regard, you be the judge: From the family institution to ..., the balance and separation of powers; from public morality to the genuine popular traditions.

[Question] Fourth, and forgive my meticulousness: "What shamefaced complex compels you to never say, plainly and simply, that you are "the Right?" Why are you re-billing yourselves as being this thing of "Center-Right?"

[Answer] So that we will be understood by the electorate. Between the PSOE and the AP, what there is, is of such scarce entity as to not be a possible alternative. Thus, if the PSOE is the Left, we are all the rest: Center and Right.

[Question] I have been reading your statements recently, and when you are asked "Are you a Rightist?" you reply "Yes, but...". But what? Are you or are you not a Rightist?

[Answer] I have not the least complex about stating that I am a Rightist. But..

[Question] There we are again. You see?

[Answer] Let me continue, Pilar. But...the concept of "the Right" must be restored in its true context, as the sole guaranty, throughout the Western world, of civil liberties, economic prosperity and the political up-to-dateness of states. Rightist, yes. But without totalitarian leanings--leanings which, in our Spanish democracy, are those of the Socialist Party alone. And those leanings are in full view.

[Question] Fraga says that he has signed his resignation, and that he will go "when the social forces come to an agreement as to a successor." However, he not only refuses to hold a Special Congress to sense whether such agreement already exists, but also prevents a secret vote and demands a show of hands, because he wants to see "the faces of those who vote and how they vote." That does not seem very democratic.

[Answer] The officials of a party, whether at the district, the provincial or the national level, hold office not by personal entitlement but as representatives of their electorates; and these have a right to know what their representatives are voting for and against. The secret vote in party assemblies is not acceptable. And my predecessor, Jorge Verstrynge, having been in possession of all the recourses and means needed to propose secret votings, never did so. Never. Does it not seem suspicious to you that he should now be demanding a secret vote precisely when he is no longer a member of the presidential board...?

'They Wanted to Sideline Fraga'

[Question] Alberto, in the turbulent episodes that are wracking the AP, there are some poorly explained aspects. A person can be removed as secretary general, or can be called "felon, traitor"; but on condition that the reason be explained, and not wrapped up in fuzzy verbiage. Let's see: Verstrynge and company were thrown out for having proposed Fraga as mayor of Madrid. What was behind this that made it so wrong? Fraga's personal fear of those elections? Why were some punished for it and others not touched who had also proposed it? And I am thinking of Alfonso Osorio, and Hernandez Mancha, and some others...

[Answer] Look: Osorio and Hernandez Mancha made that proposal in good faith, as a political possibility, within party channels..., and there was nothing censurable about it. They were legitimate suggestions. Whether or not they were on target is another question. But Verstrynge, Ruiz Soto, Olarra,

Camunas and Manglano were not acting in good faith. Their proposal, although the same, concealed a trap. They wanted to put Fraga in a position where he must either win or be definitively washed up. It was a deliberate political maneuver to prevent Fraga from being the candidate in the 1990 general elections.

[Question] Are you giving me to understand that Fraga knows he cannot win Madrid?

[Answer] Well, I'm going to be very frank. AP will be the party with the most votes in Madrid. But it will not have the absolute majority necessary to take over the mayoralty. It will need the support of Suarez's CDS. This has all been thoroughly studied, with numbers, with polls... Now then, CDS would be more likely to support AP with another candidate; that is, with a number one other than Fraga; because if Fraga were to win that mayoralty, the road to Moncloa for him in 1990 would be free and clear or at least well smoothed. In other words, what Fraga fears is not a rejection by popular vote, but rather a subsequent letdown by Adolfo Suarez. Be that as it may, aside from all of this, Verstrynge had, for some time, been maneuvering politically behind Fraga's back.

[Question] On the subject of the leaking of AP documents to the press. Is Verstrynge the culprit?

[Answer] I am a lawyer and I do not single out a culprit without having objective and incontrovertible proof. As to rebuttable presumptions, there are indeed some: Jorge, by virtue of his position, had all the party's internal documents; and not a single document has been leaked since 2 September, the date on which he left this office. On the other hand,... I must also say that many persons work here; that other persons could have had access to one or more of those documents; and that there was a considerable restructuring and reduction of personnel, at Verstrynge's instigation, of course, and over his signature, as of 31 July and 1 August. What I can tell you is that the leaker is no longer here. And that the label "felon" well befits whoever may have done it, because it was a betrayal and a despicable act.

[Question] Why did Verstrynge leave? He and his three deputies who followed him say that "they were driven to the edge of the precipice."

[Answer] Does a person who has helped to create and to build up a party--a party in which that person has worked magnificently for 10 years--have to leave it merely because he has been relieved of a responsibility? I think not. Therefore, he had either become too attached to the job as a sinecure and a status symbol..., or he had already decided to leave. In my opinion, Jorge's leaving was a well-premeditated one. Ever since the AP's most recent National Congress, the harmony and mutual confidence between Fraga and Verstrynge had been waning. Jorge was building personal plans while hedging in regard to the party's plans.

[Question] Like going over to the CDS?

[Answer] One who abandons his own ship in that manner usually has no scruples about going over to another party. But I don't believe Adolfo Suarez will accept him. Politically speaking, persons who pull off "Alzagadas" cannot be trusted. Suarez has already had a painful experience in that regard.

'Felony and Disloyalty'

[Question] 'Alzagadas?'

[Answer] Verstrynge has done what Alzaga did: Use a party to obtain a few seats, with state remuneration thrown in, then not have the dignity to resign as deputy when one dissents from the party's political plans. Those seats--Verstrynge's and Alzaga's--were obtained on blocked and sealed ballots headed by Manuel Fraga. When one legitimately differs with or ceases to believe in the viability of a policy line, he is entirely free to leave; provided, however, that he takes nothing with him and starts again from the bottom, from scratch. When one does that, it may be assumed that he is acting honestly. When one fails to do that, only one assumption is possible: felony, disloyalty..., to Fraga and to the voters of AP. Without Fraga's umbrella, Verstrynge would not be a deputy today.

[Question] The AP voters are beginning to be fed up with your party. Putting aside these happenings, which are trifles considering the political weight swung by the Verstrynge-ist turncoats, how are you going to persuade your constituencies that it's really worthwhile to vote for your party...., considering that you always lose?

[Answer] Yes, there is popular disappointment. People thought we were going to win this time. But we will have to learn to take a defeat in stride.

[Question] What do you mean by "a defeat?" It will be still "another" defeat...

[Answer] The fact is that in 1982, AP registered a spectacular gain, from 9 seats to 106 seats. Besides, we were not then in a position to win: The PSOE had taken root in our society; it had convinced the people of the validity and the necessity of its platform for change. The Socialist victory was foreordained.

[Question] And now, in 1986, and from a base of those 106 seats and over 5 million votes, why has your party not been able to convince the people of something as evident as the fact that the PSOE has governed badly?

[Answer] Because for 4 years, the PSOE has prevented that "so evident" message from reaching the people. They have used all the mass media to their advantage against us. We have suffered 4 years of insults, attacks,

manipulation of information, lack of support in all the public institutions...

[Question] That is to say that the Government was the opposition's opposition... And meanwhile, what in the devil were you people doing? Let's not kid ourselves, this is the nub of the matter: Neither victory nor defeat can be improvised. They are "earned" step-by-step.

[Answer] We have waged on the opposition to the Government. Although perhaps our error has been to center it on the larger debates and issues of state, instead of on concrete, day-to-day problems. Perhaps it has been a mistake to wage the opposition more behind closed doors than in the streets; to follow the line of a state policy, without devoting sufficient attention to the more detailed, more commonplace issues, of the household and the workplace that concern the citizen on a day-to-day basis. But during this legislative term we are going to wage a hard-nosed, incisive, heated, down-to-earth opposition that will reach out to the people and that will eat away at the governing party. And no pacts!

(I rise to browse around the office. I'm curious to see what Ruiz-Gallardon has brought with him. A painting by Rafael Alberti. A night scene. A photo of Fraga surrounded by children; another of a populous meeting in a bullring...)

[Answer] That meeting took place in 1977. I had just joined...

[Question] The "seven magnificents" were there... Of course. What about that story about your political ties with Lopez Rodo?

[Answer] A lie. My father worked with him, yes. I didn't.

'I've Not Had the Least Contact with Opus'

[Question] And where did TVE get the "news" of your membership in Opus Dei?

[Answer] That's what I'd like to know. I've not had the least contact with Opus Dei. I've never attended a single function, cultural, religious, or..., not even a spiritual retreat session. I'm not a member of Opus Dei. Of course, if I were I would say so. But I believe that if I wanted to be one, they would make it difficult for me or not admit me at all.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Well..., because I don't meet the prerequisites of exemplariness, commitment and inner compulsion, ascetic and apostolic, for membership in Opus Dei. I am a Catholic, and confess my faith without reservations and with profound gratitude, because it has helped me very much in my life. I go to Mass on Sundays and holy days. Morally, I believe my conduct conforms

to the mandates of the Church. I admire Pope John Paul II, as pontiff and as a person; I believe he is going to leave a profound and very enriching imprint on Catholics throughout the world... I try to be a good husband, a good father and a good son. But I am not an exemplary man. However, I do try, sincerely, to improve a little each day. Let's say I am a Catholic who strives...

[Question] I was going to ask you your attitudes towards the issues of divorce and abortion; but since you tell me you are a Catholic and that you live according to that faith and that morality, I assume that your views in these two matters are orthodox...

[Answer] Of course. The marriage bond is of a natural order and therefore indissoluble. On the other hand, if I were in a position of governing responsibility, I would not impose indissolubility on anyone who disagrees with it. However, as for myself, I knew, when I married, that I was contracting a commitment for always. As regards abortion, scientific evidence bears out that it produces the death of a human being; and, juridically, it involves the profound violation of another being's right, not one's own: A child's right to be born. In this regard, I would provide positive solutions: Guarantee a family to a child not wanted by its mother--and that is very easy to do in a country where there are many married couples seeking to be adoptive parents; have the state bear the costs of pregnancy and birth instead of the cost of abortions; and apply creative intelligence to public campaigns on responsible attitudes towards maternity and paternity.

[Question] You were telling me a few minutes ago about how it feels to parachute down. How does one feel, inversely, when one is catapulted overnight, at the age of 27, to the position of secretary general of the major opposition party? An "inverse vertigo?"

[Answer] No. Well..., initially, your heart skips a beat. "My God!" you say. "What's going to happen to me?" If you use the position to gain something else, thinking of "tomorrow"..., it can be very dangerous. But if you center your efforts and concentrate on the task that has been entrusted to you, and only that, there is neither vertigo nor inverse vertigo, nor sense of power..., nor solitude. I, at least, feel greatly helped, highly welcome, and warmly accompanied. I know my place: I am not the "number two" in AP; above me and before me are the vice presidents. And to know that, and know it well, is sound, and wholesome.

[Question] But it can entail the risk of other types of motion illness, ranging from the feeling of being "secretary-orderly-of-the-chief-Fraga" to that of fancying oneself the "dauphin-grandson-heir-apparent-of-the-sheikh-Fraga"...

[Answer] Well then, I'm lucky. I have no intention of becoming Fraga's orderly; nor does he have that intention. I intend to be what I am. Myself.

I will make my own decisions and account for them. It is that simple. And although, in politics, it is within the realm of legitimate ambition to dream of one day being prime minister, it is neither my outlook nor my desire. I don't imagine myself a "dauphin." My sole obsession is to accomplish the objectives Fraga has entrusted to me, to the best of my ability and know-how. Interestingly enough, Fraga did not tell me why he was appointing me, but rather the objectives of my appointment.

'I See Fraga As a Candidate in 1990'

[Question] And what were those objectives?

[Answer] To build up the party. To consolidate it. To ensure that each and every member, wherever he or she may be, is made fully aware of not being a mere spectator, but rather a teammate. And that in his or her dedication to the party lies the key to its strength, to its social presence, and to the political success we all seek for AP. That is how we intend to build a "popular" party--one that will depend on the work of its grass roots, on the social consensus of its members. Exactly the contrary of what occurs in the PSOE, where all the play has been subjugated by the Government officials, of higher or lower echelon, and by the brass: In sum, the anonymous grass roots count for nothing; everything is done and undone by a bunch of "senores" on salaries paid out of public funds--the delegates and deal-makers..., who cannot differ with the "apparatus," for fear of being "sheet-rolled," dislodged from their Government positions and dispossessed of their salaries. There is no room there for freedom or independence. They've got them leashed by way of their pockets.

[Question] Fraga till 1990..., or Fraga for 1990?

(He again "grips" the gold-plated ballpoint. An immediate and subconscious reaction... The seconds hand of my watch ticks off 3, 4, 5, 6 seconds... I ask myself: What's happening? Is the parachute failing to open? Finally he replies.)

[Answer] Fraga knows he can leave. Between him and the 220,000-or-so members, the distance is abysmal; but there would be a substitute. Indeed, in the plural: Five or six possible substitutes. But there is no need to go seeking them, when we have a leader of his human, political, cultural and historical stature. I see him as our candidate for 1990, forceful and surrounded by young people... Like a good ship's captain, with a skillful and spirited crew. And I want him for 1990.

[Question] Long live Fraga! Woe, should he lose!

[Answer] Fraga represents our best chance to win.

[Question] Many people are saying the opposite.

[Answer] Those who say the opposite are those who will then vote PSOE.

[Question] "Aha! That's the point!" as Cantinflas would say. To say that one who plans to vote PSOE rejects Fraga is not the same as saying that one who rejects Fraga ends up voting PSOE. And that is not just a tongue twister, Gallardon; it is a reiterated experience.

[Answer] Well, I say: Fraga as leader? Yes. Fraga alone? No. The party has to be decentralized and more responsibilities and operating autonomy must be given to the regional structures. Fraga should not have to earn, one-on-one, in person, the vote of every last hamlet in Spain. And AP has to be as significant in Madrid as it is in Seville.

(This Gallardon appears to be made of steel, and well-tempered steel, at that. He surprises me, and I like him).

#### 'PSOE Governance Is One of Partisanism'

[Question] When one is 27 years of age and those years have been dedicated to the studies of a law career, to passing the competitive examination for prosecuting attorney, to exercising that post for 2 years, to being a councillor in the Madrid Ayuntamiento, to militating devotedly within a party, to marrying Maria del Mar Utrera, to bringing two children into the world, and another who is on the way..., one can hardly have a "prior enemy," but may well have an "internal enemy" and an "external enemy." Let's talk about them.

[Answer] As to a prior enemy, I have none: I am a man without a "dossier." Internal enemy? I know of no one. But there may be someone of whom I'm not aware. External enemy? Let's leave it at adversary: The PSOE. I think it is well not to mistake one's enemies. The Socialists have fallen into the very totalitarianism they have so ardently vilified in the past. Their governance is flawed, one of barefaced partisanship, for the benefit of a few. They are using power more for the purpose of ensuring their immediate electoral success than to guarantee Spain a prosperous future. They have defrauded society and their own members. And I don't mean "they have disappointed," but that "they have acted fraudulently, deceitfully," in-house and outside it. Socialism is an economic doctrine, one of distribution of economic well-being. But the PSOE has shattered it. They no longer believe in their doctrine; and less in the artificial pragmatism they are applying. They have no future plan for society...

[Question] There, I think you are deceiving yourself. They are not proceeding haphazardly, nor are they blind..., nor is there much improvisation in the structure of what they are trying to do. They know where they are headed. And where they want to take us...

[Answer] Let me shade that. I meant to say that they don't have a positive and beneficial plan for society. Negative ones, yes! You bet they do! They

act in opposition to the most fundamental of freedoms and rights: From the right to life and the right to work, to the freedom of information, of education of justice... Issues that should be debated in Parliament, they take to the courts. And there, they have a pushover. It's shameful that magistrates 65 years of age, presiding judges of the Supreme Court, should be sitting on the basis of interim 6-to-12-month contracts. The alternatives are clear: Either one goes along with the one empowered to renew his contract..., or one goes home. On that basis, do you think there can be independent judges--let alone justice?

[Question] As a prosecuting attorney, what do you think of the appointing of your colleague Moscoso?

[Answer] Well look, Pilar: Neither Javier Moscoso nor I, clearly identified politically as we both are with a party, are properly eligible to be prosecuting attorneys of the state...

[Question] Perhaps Mr Moscoso, who has already switched parties three times--UCD, PAD and PSOE--has uncommon capacity for asepsis, amnesia and independence...

[Answer] It is unrepresentable that a person who has done doctrinal homage to the PSOE, and who has just left the Socialist Government, should be deemed eligible to represent the juridical interests, the legal equity and the rights of an entire nation! Organically, one might be beholden to the prime minister, but must not be so to a party.

#### 'They Are Trashing the Collective Hope'

[Question] You have come down very hard in passing judgment on the PSOE. Why are they such a thorn in your side?

[Answer] Because they are abusing the power entrusted to them by democracy; and because they are trashing and dumping overboard the collective hope of a people.

[Question] You made a gesture upon taking office in this position: You declined the official car and the bodyguard. But isn't it somewhat foolish to say it in public and remain unprotected and wide open?

[Answer] It may be dangerous. But if you are going to demand austerity of a party deeply in debt, you must advocate by first setting the example. And in addition, you must say it. I have a car, just a standard little car, a Ford Escort; and it is the one I will continue using. That's all I need.

[Question] And has your salary been decided?

[Answer] I myself must decide it. And it will not exceed that of any deputy. I believe they earn 270,000 [pesetas] a month.

[Question] You've not been here very long--a little over a month, right? But perhaps you could tell me: What price are you beginning to pay?

[Answer] I'm beginning to pay what is to me the most painful price of all: My family life. I enjoy being home, with my little family. There, I have my reservoir of tranquility, of inner peace. There, I gather renewed energy. There, I rekindle my joy... It's hard for me to arrive home and not see my children awake. To leave home very early and return very late... And not have time to be with my wife, listening to music, reading, or going out on the town, as we used to do...

[Question] That has a marvelous flip side, Alberto.

[Answer] What is it?

[Question] Become a "Sunday-crowder"... Have you ever seen a more happy people? There's nothing better than a Saturday-night-into-Sunday. Didn't you know that?

[Answer] I'm beginning to find that out.

9399

CSO: 3548/16

POLITICAL

SPAIN

## RACIAL TENSIONS REPORTEDLY INCREASING IN MELILLA

### Anti-Spanish Pamphlets Distributed

Madrid EL ALCAZAR in Spanish 24 Oct 86 p 11

[Article by J.P.]

[Text] "Moroccan brothers, Spanish colonialism is continuing to control and govern the territories despoiled by General Franco. The fortresses of Ceuta and Melilla are daggers thrust into the hearts of Muslims all over the world. Our blood brothers continue to be sidelined and tortured in the House of Terror (sic) by a democracy that has changed nothing. Brothers, the struggle must begin immediately if we want those two Moroccan cities to return to the Alawite (sic) motherland. You must be prepared to shed your blood generously. The Law on Foreigners is a trick by the Spanish colonialist government. Death to the invader." That is the complete text appearing on a number of pamphlets appearing in Melilla over the past few days. They have been unanimously rejected by all the nationalist parties and groups, which are demanding an investigation concerning the authors of that libel.

So far, the sources consulted by EL ALCAZAR have placed responsibility for the production and dissemination of those leaflets on members of Terra Omnia. Others feel that it might be the most immediate consequence of the "Manicheism existing in some people who want to serve Moroccan interests while treacherously wearing the mask of Spanishness."

Some members of the PNM-APROME whom we consulted consider it inadmissible that the Government Intelligence Services, which are so inclined to hand over all kinds of information against the most distinguished Hispanophiles, are incapable of exposing the people responsible for these acts which have had the effect of destabilizing social and political life in the long-suffering city of Melilla.

### Assaults

As a result of those acts, a member of the La Paz neighborhood association--one of the neighborhood groups in the vanguard of Melilla's political defense--received serious knife wounds last Wednesday night. The incident

occurred when some unknown individuals burst in on the association with the intention, according to witnesses, of attacking their chairman, nationalist Jaime Galiana.

After a great struggle with his attackers, he was able to find a place of safety until the first police officers arrived.

It has been impossible so far to learn other details concerning what happened, since Galiana prefers to say nothing about the incident for fear of a new escalation of violence.

Rafael Diez de la Cortina emphasizes: "As a result of this new action, the solution to what is happening in Melilla depends solely and exclusively on the reaction by our Armed Forces."

#### Subaire May Leave Joint Commission

According to a cable picked up from EUROPA PRESS, the chairman of the Muslim Community of Ceuta, Ahmed Subaire, may decide within the next few hours to adopt a number of measures for pressing demands following the departure of Muslim officials in Ceuta from the joint commission representing the government and Muslim groups in Ceuta and Melilla.

According to Subaire, a series of action measures will be proposed today, Friday, at a meeting by members of the board of directors of the Muslim Community and the neighborhood committees.

The Muslim leader justified the breaking off of negotiations with the government in these words: "We are not prepared to be tricked anymore or to let them continue to lead us on: in 8 months of negotiations, we have made no progress whatever."

Subaire complained that his policy of dialogue and understanding had not done any good, and he accused government authorities of being to blame for the situation that may now arise. He said: "We have not wanted confrontation. We have always asked our group to remain calm and patient, and we put a stop to a demonstration being organized by radical leaders. It has done no good, and what has happened is that other people have been given cause to take over the reins, but let it be made clear that it is not we who will be to blame."

#### Muslim Leader Threatens Resignation

Madrid EL ALCAZAR in Spanish 24 Oct 86 p 11

[Article by Olvido Obregon]

[Text] The adviser to the minister of interior for the Muslim minority, Aomar Mohamedi Duuu, has threatened to resign his post within "a week or two" if the problems of his community in Melilla are not solved. He says the upcoming municipal elections in Melilla have produced "competition to see who is most xenophobic and racist" among all the political parties without exception.

Dudu held a press conference following his appearance before the Budget Committee of the Congress of Deputies, a meeting that became quite tense after questions by Deputy Useros (People's Group, Melilla) began to reflect on Dudu's religion and the committee chairman read the rules in the Constitution requiring respect for religious beliefs. The conservative deputies explained that their questions were concerned with the budget in any case, since they were intended to ascertain the reason for the job of adviser, which has required an increase in the Ministry of Interior's general service budget.

Aomar Dudu told the press that he had not decided whether to run for mayor of that African city in the municipal elections, but that he would not do so as long as the Muslims--some 17,000 strong--did not have voting rights. He added that discrimination was occurring at all official levels in Melilla, examples being, in his opinion, the delay in granting naturalization and the withdrawal of medical care from residents of Moroccan origin. He said: "In Melilla, the topic has flared up again because of the upcoming municipal elections. There is competition to see which party--I am not talking about national parties--to see which local party is most aggressive toward Muslims, because that worked for the People's Coalition in the general elections, when it elected one deputy and two senators. Racism and xenophobia are growing worse."

At another point, Dudu pointed out that "if the situation gets worse, the Muslim assembly in Melilla may question my presence in the Ministry of Interior. I am leader of the Muslim community first and adviser to the minister second, and this situation will have to be resolved very soon." Asked what the time limit would be for resolving the situation, Aomar Mohamedi Dudu went on to say that it would be "a week or two" and that "it will be less a matter of my leaving than of their throwing me out if they prevent me from doing my job."

The tense appearance before the Budget Committee turned into an interrogation of the Muslim leader by Deputy Useros of the People's Group. Dudu complained constantly that he was appearing before the Budget Committee and that he had no reason to answer certain questions, such as those concerning the meaning of the Islamic religion, whether he had taken an oath on the Constitution or promised to uphold it, or whether he had gone to Morocco to reassure Hassan II concerning the naturalizations. He answered: "I don't know how that translates into pesetas." He clarified other points, however, saying, for example, that his recent trip to the Alawite kingdom had not been paid for by the ministry but out of his own pocket and that he had not met with members of the Istiqlal organization. During his questioning, Useros also explained the other version of the situation in Melilla, saying, for example, that the Muslims celebrate Morocco's Independence Day and that the Muslim religion enjoins political subordination as a duty. At the conclusion of the speeches, Socialist Deputy Carlos Navarrete accused the conservative benches of having behaved like fanatics.

During his statements, the leader of the Islamic community also charged that "we have found hundreds of cases of falsified naturalization" and that the entire process is over a year behind schedule. "It is necessary to fix responsibility, but the buck is being passed from one person to another."

When asked why the Muslims in Melilla do not have rights, he repeated that it was because they do not have Spanish nationality, "but we are not foreigners. We are natives of and indigenous to Melilla, and we are in our own territory, but it seems that we are begging." On the question of his own nationality--the People's Group in Congress having submitted a question to the government requiring a written answer as to whether Dudu has Spanish nationality and has renounced his Moroccan nationality--Aomar Mohamedi said that "I get more surprised every day," and he recalled that a Melilla newspaper had just published his birth certificate to prove that he is not Spanish.

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CSO: 3548/21

POLITICAL

TURKEY

KURDS PROTEST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

AU221936 Vienna Domestic Service in German 1700 GMT 21 Nov 86

[Helmut Opletal report on press conference given by the Vienna "Society for Threatened People" in Vienna on 21 November]

[Text] The Vienna "Society for Threatened Peoples," a group that is not affiliated with any party and comes out worldwide for the protection of threatened minorities, has requested that the Austrian delegation to the Vienna CSCE conference bring up the problem of the oppressed Kurds in Turkey. In a letter to the Austrian CSCE delegation head Ambassador Torovsky, the "Society for Threatened Peoples" points out that the Western states very rightly support, for example, the Jews in the Soviet Union or the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, but that the suppression of ethnic groups in Turkey must be condemned as well. And this first and foremost applies to the Kurds, Armenians, and Assyrians. Turkey too, pledged in the Helsinki documents to protect the rights of national minorities. Twenty million Kurds live in Asia Minor, spread over five states, but most of them live in southern and eastern Turkey, where even the most elementary national rights are being denied to them.

Robert Pot of the "Society for Threatened Peoples" lists the most blatant forms of discrimination.

[Begin Pot recording] There is no education in the mother tongue, no Kurdish publications, but prison, persecution and torture if somebody stands up as a Kurd for the rights of the Kurdish people. The Republic of Turkey denies the existence of the Kurds or of other non-Turkish ethnic groups on its territory at all, and this is also reflected in many sections of the Turkish Constitution of 1982. Among other things, this Turkish Constitution by definition declares everybody a Turkish citizen regardless whether he is a Kurd, Armenian and so forth. I am referring to Section 66 here. Turkish is proclaimed the only official and teaching language and the use of any other language is banned as far as expressing one's opinion or the freedom of the press are concerned. In addition to this Turkish nationalism, which is incorporated in the Constitution, other provisions exist that are also being applied. Very many of these are in the Penal Code. And then there is Section 89 of the party law, which says that official parties must not maintain that on the territory of the Turkish Republic, there exist minorities which are based on ethnical, political, or linguistic differences. Thus, there are many provisions in both the Constitution and in the Turkish Penal Code which enable

the government to consider criminal all demands for cultural or political rights of a minority and this criminalization is also being carried out.  
[end recording]

A representative of the Kurds living in Austria points out that the ban of the Kurdish language in the schools and public life also means serious discrimination in the chances for an education and in economic life.

[Begin recording of unidentified Kurd] They are trying in school to assimilate us by forcing us to learn Turkish. I went through this myself. When I went to school--I was seven years old--they beat me so that I would not speak Kurdish. I experienced this myself. I only learned Turkish much later. Another consequence is that one needs much more time to get an education. Thus the language plays a decisive role in a person's development. [end recording]

And a restoration of the freedom of the press and speech is still out of question even after the end of the military dictatorship in Turkey as long as the use of the Kurdish language in print is threatened with stiff penalties.

[Begin recording of unidentified Kurd] In 1975 and 76, roughly in those years, newspapers were published in both the Kurdish and Turkish languages. But the Turkish state naturally banned the publication of any paper in the Kurdish language because this language damages the national feelings of Turkey. Therefore the Kurds cannot publish any newspaper in their own language. This is absolutely forbidden in Turkish Kurdistan. In such cases people are sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. [end recording]

The organizers of the press conference pointed out that even after the change from the military dictatorship to a civilian government in Turkey no improvements have occurred in the treatment of the Kurdish ethnic group. This is why the 'Society for Threatened Peoples' objects to the further whitewashing of Turkey and to absolving it from violations of human rights, as was done by the Western states at the Council of Europe, with the formal justification that the European human rights convention only contains very vague provisions about the protection of minorities.

/9274  
CSO: 3620/68

ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

AGREEMENT REACHED ON SOVIET USE OF RHINE-MAIN-DANUBE CANAL

Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 30 Oct 86 p 4

[Article by Gerhard Hennemann: "Rules of the Game for the Red Inland Waterways Fleet"]

[Text] Minister for Transport Werner Dollinger can be quite satisfied with the result of his latest talks on transport issues with the Soviet government, at least in one partial area. For the first time since the start of a transport dialogue with Moscow at the beginning of the 1970's, concrete progress was achieved in German-Soviet shipping relations.

The initialling of an inland waterway agreement on the future use of the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal and all other FRG inland waterways is surprising in that Moscow has given up its originally demonstrated hard line, just about 5 years before the anticipated opening of the controversial connection between the Black Sea and the North Sea. Not too long ago, the Soviets insisted strongly on their demand that the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal be declared an international waterway without restrictions. This prospect, however, caused such a storm of resistance among German inland waterways shipping that Moscow signalled for the first time this summer its willingness to discuss an agreement on inland waterways shipping.

At first glance, the draft agreement which has now been negotiated and initialled, appears to be a solution satisfactory to both sides. The fear of German shipping companies--that the Red inland waterways fleet would have uncontrolled access to the ever decreasing freight on West European inland waterways, particularly on the Rhine--was countered by several articles of the agreement. In essence, they provide for cargo division at par and "economically remunerative" freight rates for the so-called reciprocal traffic between the Soviet Union and the FRG. In addition, both sides have the right to establish upper limits in bilateral shipping transport, but only in exceptional cases. Observance of the agreement is to be supervised by a joint commission which, among other things, will also have to deal with setting maximum and minimum freight rates.

What is striking in the text of the agreement, which takes into account the essential demands of FRG shipping companies, is the final sentence which was

now added in Moscow at the request of the Soviet delegation. In it, the Federal government affirms expressly that the use of the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal will take place not only on the basis of the future inland waterways shipping agreement, but also according to the principles of equal rights and non-discrimination. Spelled out, this means that as a matter of principle, Soviet shipping enterprises receive the same concessions as shipping companies from other countries. Several provisions of the agreement specify and limit this assurance. But the fact of its specific mention at Soviet insistence may confirm the critics of Moscow's shipping policy in their opinion that in future, the Russians want to make full use of the commercial freedoms of the free market economy not only on the oceans, but also on West European inland waterways. The agreement on inland waterways shipping will hardly stop them, in the daily price competition, from giving up the advantage of a supplier who calculates predominantly on a political basis.

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CSO: 3620/48

ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

KIECHLE REVIEWS STRUCTURAL, MARKETING PROBLEMS IN AGRICULTURE

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 25 Oct 86 p 5

[Article by Klaus Peter Krause: "Ignaz Kiechle's Agricultural Policy"]

[Text] [Box, second column]

German agriculture consists of 758,300 farms, of which at least 42 percent are operated only on a part-time basis (by so-called "also-farmers"). The farmers work on too small a scale (an average of only 16 hectares per farm). Sixty-one percent of all farms are smaller than the average 16 hectares. Agriculture employs 1.3 million people (5 percent of all employed persons) and achieves a production value of DM61 billion (3.3 percent of the gross national product). Per household, farmers produce an average income of DM44,318 (worker households, DM37,988; white collar households, DM48,113). They get a good deal when it comes to income tax: 70 percent of full-time farmers annually pay no more than DM100 per family. Every farm receives an average annual subsidy of a little over DM48,000, or about DM2,600 per hectare.]

The greatest problem child of the European Community is its agriculture and its agricultural policy. At least, that is where the EC spends most of its money, namely two-thirds of its budgeted funds. These expenditures have embroiled the EC in a permanent financial crisis. German farmers are full of dissatisfaction and fear of the future.

Since 30 March 1983, Ignaz Kiechle (CSU), a farmer from the Allgäu and former breeder of dairy cows, as minister for agriculture has been responsible for agricultural policy. His policy is controversial even within agricultural circles. Farmers have shouted him down, or applauded him. Because of his measures of constraint, some consider him their gravedigger; others place in him their hope for survival as farmers. His agricultural policy is meant to keep farmers in agriculture, not to drive them out, and is to secure decent incomes also for small farmers. But not through more market and less state influence--just the opposite.

Kiechle, however, also wants to rid present agricultural policy of its grotesque abuses. For example, butter at give-away prices for the political opponent, the Soviet Union; that is to be stopped some day. The same holds

true for feeding surplus butter to calves. Kiechle wants to make European agricultural policy again half-way presentable. For this reason he pushes through government measures of restraint so that free market adherents are crossing themselves.

But even Kiechle's greatest opponents respect and recognize the personal qualities of this peasant minister: he is modest and courageous, factual and sincere, quiet and forceful, free of polemics, willing to discuss and listen--actually, not a politician at all. In the beginning, many underestimated this simple man and the effect of his appealing human traits. How does he himself see his agricultural policy?

Kiechle himself says: "First of all, I prevented the (former) resolution of the European agricultural ministers from coming into effect, which would have withdrawn price guarantees automatically with increasing production amounts. I consider it totally wrong under the circumstances, and above all, socially untenable, since it lumps together small and large, good and bad structures, excellent and poor regions."

Kiechle considers it his second special success that a further increase in milk production was averted. The government milk price guarantee for every dairy farmer is now limited to a maximum amount, to a milk quota. Although he claims modestly that he only collaborated in this, in reality it was he who practically forced through this economic control tool. In this success he sees a "refusal of the theory that the market and price should regulate supply."

But then he remembers a third success: "In addition to prices as a source of income--but which are a drop in the bucket in their effect on income--I have considerably advanced the policy of subsidies independent of production for farmers in so-called disadvantaged regions. In addition to price policy, we need both these elements, the quota system and direct income subsidies."

What are Kiechle's failures? What were his disappointments? He sees a basic failure in the fact that the new (since 1985) European Commission in Brussels (with its agricultural commissar, Frans Andriessen) has switched completely from its past agricultural policy to an entirely economic approach. He had been able to brake some of its effects, but had not been able to convince them "that this is the wrong road for the structure in Europe."

And the disappointments? Kiechle says: "The attitude of some representatives of farmers' associations were frustrating for me. Despite their awareness of the changed world market situation and the difficulties of marketing, they have always maintained the thesis vis-à-vis the farmers that the farmer does not notice these things. And if production is cut back, the government should be solely responsible."

Wasn't Kiechle's veto in Brussels also a failure? On 12 June 1985, supported by Kohl and Strauss, he had used this very first German veto at the council table in order to prevent lowering the support price for grain. The other member states had been willing to accept it, but Kiechle declared that

important interests of the FRG were at stake, whereby he avoided being outvoted. But shortly thereafter, the commission overrode the veto with the help of a kind of emergency decree and ordered the price reduction on its own.

Yet Kiechle does not want to accept that as a failure: the fact that Germany protested at the council table had had an effect, after all. The commission and the council members knew from that day onward "that we, in contrast to the former government, will uphold such a No, if it is important to us."

But was it really worth the effort, exercising the veto over a paltry lowering of the grain price? Was it not applied to the wrong object? But Kiechle was not primarily concerned with the 3.6 percent, and later 1.8 percent; the decisive point was to invalidate the resolution of an automatic response, "overproduction is answered by price reduction." This had been achieved. One year later, the council rescinded the resolution.

One year later, in April 1986, Kiechle no longer exercised the veto and let himself be outvoted by the other 11 agricultural ministers. And wasn't there more at stake than in 1985: price reduction for fodder grain of up to 5 percent; sales revenue losses for grain farmers because of a producer levy; no price increases for beef, pork, milk and sugar? How does Kiechle assess this defeat? Kiechle: "No, that was not a defeat. I was able to considerably improve the commission's proposals. But I could not vote for it, for this time, also, it was a matter of principle. I was, and am, unwilling to accept a policy which for 10 years too many had bet on productivity increases, and I am unwilling to have the farmers alone bear the consequences of this political mistake. I see no possibility of creating long-term equalization, for instance through the famous direct subsidies. This can perhaps be done for the present generation, but not for the next one. At the end is the same goal, namely, to get farms out of production."

Does Kiechle want to preserve this enlarged agriculture as a sort of enormous agricultural outdoor museum? Was it not sensible to let agriculture shrink during the past 100 years? Kiechle says: "Yes and no. At that time there was no agricultural policy. It simply developed. We are not hindering the process of structural improvement, on the contrary. We do not wish to force farms out of production which are too small to provide a living for the next generation by putting them under psychological and financial pressure. We want to leave them completely free to strive for a better income, also by combining incomes. We provide a social cushion through milk payment and through voluntary temporary production stops."

But is there not the danger that farmers misunderstand such a policy, that they delude themselves into thinking that they could manage to survive? Kiechle does not think so: "I am aware how attached especially small farmers are to their property. Even with a policy of economic pressure they tend to dig in their heels even more so. It is possible that I am wrong, but that has been my experience. Furthermore, I say openly in my speeches that with the flooding of the markets, everyone should consider whether it wouldn't be better to look for a combined income within and outside of agriculture, rather

than investing another DM350,000 in order to attain a higher income through larger production."

But should smaller farms, which are already ailing economically and probably cannot survive in the long term, really be subsidized as much as, and more so than, larger ones, which have a much better chance of survival and are probably still healthy economically? Does this not drive the still healthy ones into the camp of the ailing ones, as stated by the farmers' association in Schleswig-Holstein, among others?

Kiechle thinks these considerations to be wrong; farm and political representatives had always buttressed their demands for higher prices and better incomes with the argument that it was small and medium-size farms that were going under. Only about 5 percent of all farms had 50 hectares or more. "Sometimes I ask myself just where our large farms really are. But I do know that someone with 20 hectares (and about one-fourth of all farms are 10 to 20 hectares in size) stands at the brink. He has a lot of work and still only little money."

Then Kiechle points to the part-time farms: "They, at least, we have not made as well off as full-time farmers. But I am not quite happy about that. Because, if we have created the part-time farm as a political solution of equal value and even encouraged people to go into it, one cannot simply say 10 years later: you don't count any more, you are taken care of and have agriculture as a hobby. And then, there are also part-time farmers who do not work for Mercedes and VW, but as stone breakers, lumbermen or some such thing who need their farm as a source of income. They must definitely be kept on the subsidy roll."

Must an agriculture minister always be a farmer? Is he not often in a situation where he makes decisions also affecting his own pocket? How does one live with such a conflict of interests? So far Kiechle has never had the feeling of a conflict of interests, not even in critical self-examination: "But I naturally admit that in many decisions I think as a farmer. I cannot share the abstract way of thinking which I sometimes find at the council table, detached from the people concerned. I do not know whether that is a drawback."

But must not the minister think also in economic categories, particularly when he knows that only the smallest percentage of the cost of the present agricultural policy gets to the farmers? Kiechle says: "That is not an easy question, but believe me, I consider that more often than people would suppose." Of course, he soothes his conscience by pointing to, as he says, the comparatively low food prices here and the range of foodstuffs, probably the most varied in the world. And he continues: "In the end result, it is an enormously consumer-friendly policy. The taxpayer, however, is being shortchanged. Much of his money is misdirected. For this reason, my policy is to cut back production. I think that in this regard I am one of the reformers."

The wide range of foodstuffs, the relative stability of food prices—are they not purely a product of chance, (among other things) an unintentional consequence of overproduction caused by state guaranteed prices? Doesn't Kiechle want to cut back overproduction for the very reason to finally be able to raise prices? Kiechle admits: "People like myself also use the argument of low food prices for the defense in favor of farmers." But he also makes it unmistakably clear: "It is not the goal of my agricultural policy, and never will be, to keep consumer prices as low as possible through deliberate measures such as surplus supplies. That would not be a balance."

He defends his striving for higher prices: "The accusation against farmers is the following: you produce too much, so the difficulties with market prices are your own fault. We spend so much money, and yet it no longer gets to you." Then, Kiechle thinks, the logical consequence must be to reduce supplies. And this reduction, also according to market laws, can only mean better prices. On the other hand, he does not want to create actual shortages, thus driving up prices. He only wants to adjust the supply to the demand of the European inland market, "knowing full well that, essentially, European exports with their subsidies swallow the tax money, thus achieving that we get cost-oriented prices for farmers, also."

Kiechle justifies higher prices for farmers also with the performance which they achieve on the side: "Farmers are a precondition for minimum settlements in rural areas. They tend the landscape as we know it; without farmers, it would become underbrush with thistles and thorns. And with their small-farm structure, they are also protectors of the environment, because they do not produce with greatest intensity and have no regional concentration as, for instance, in Oldenburg and in Holland. But those are achievements which so far no one has honored."

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CSO: 3620/48

ECONOMIC

TURKEY

INSTITUTE ACKNOWLEDGES POOR GNP ACCOUNTING METHODS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 26 Aug 86 p 11

[Article: "National Income Calculations by Sleight of Hand"]

[Text] Ankara (ANKA)--The State Statistical Institute [SSI] has confessed that the calculation of the national income has been based on sleight-of-hand practices. An SSI publication entitled "Calculation of the National Product in Turkey" enumerates the failings in the calculation process.

The publication states that the most important problem in the calculation of the national product is the paucity of data. It draws attention to the fact that insufficient information is available about prices for past periods in order to determine the added value generated in the service sector at constant prices.

The SSI publication points out that the estimates for agricultural produce are subjective, saying: "It is necessary to utilize new technology in estimating output and thus to achieve more realistic figures." It cites the following views concerning the shortcomings in the agricultural sector: "It is necessary to recognize the fact that certain technical coefficients such as the amount of seed sown, the proportion wasted, the amount of fuel and oil consumed by tractors and other vehicles, and the proportion of straw in the produce are rather outdated, and to review and update all these quantities and ratios."

The SSI publication points out that certain estimates are based entirely on assumption. It notes that there is absolutely no data on the use of farmyard manure and states that calculations have been based on the assumption that the rate of development for stockbreeding holds true for manure as well.

The SSI publication cites the failure of employers to provide information on time as the main problem encountered in dealing with the manufacturing industry. The publication notes that where firms fail to provide information on time, estimates for their performance are based on figures for the corresponding sector, and it states that this practice carries risks as it can lead to an under- or overrepresentation of the rate of development.

Thus, for instance, the estimate for the State Monopolies Administration for 1985 was based on the rate of development for the corresponding sector when

the administration failed to pass on the necessary information on time. But when the information was received later, it turned out that the rate of development for the administration was higher. This example cited in the SSI publication shows that not even public establishments are providing information on time for the calculation of the national product.

The following are some of the other shortcomings in the calculation of the national product as revealed in the SSI publication:

--Data connected with water supplies is obtained from eight major municipalities, and the other municipalities are ignored in view of the difficulties in the collection of information. It would be useful to extend the coverage.

--Municipalities are not sending information concerning construction on time. The commissioning of buildings without obtaining the certificate for commissioning are being ignored. Construction permits are far from giving a complete picture of the actual construction going on.

--Talks have taken place with the Domestic Trade Administration, the Trade Registration Administration, and the Ministry of Finance and Customs with a view to obtaining information concerning the amount of borrowing by bankers and the interest charged by them, but it has proven impossible to obtain the necessary information.

--In view of the fact that a large proportion of the entrepreneurial revenues arising from activities by Turkish contractors and businessmen in foreign countries is not transferred to Turkey, these revenues are not included in the external net revenues account.

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CSO: 3554/07

ECONOMIC

TURKEY

COMPLAINTS ABOUT TEXTILE QUOTA DISTRIBUTION DISCUSSED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 27 Aug 86 p 9

[Report by Meral Tamer]

[Text] Following the serious accusations made by the parties in dispute in connection with the allocation of the EEC and U.S. quotas for ready-to-wear clothing, the Office of the Under Secretary of the Treasury and Foreign Trade entered the scene and organized a meeting in Ankara that brought together the parties concerned 2 days ago. It was decided at the conclusion of the meeting that henceforth information on the share of the quota allocated to each firm will be available at any time to any inquirer. Within this framework, the identity of the firms that were allocated shares in the quota and the quantities awarded to each were announced. The first round of the quarrel over the sharing out of the quota has thus been settled for the time being.

A scrutiny of the lists disclosed by the General Secretariat of the Istanbul Exporters Association affiliated with the Office of the Under Secretary of the Treasury and Foreign Trade shows that the complaints by manufacturer-exporters that did not get a share of the quotas that "the quotas were shared out among 3-5 firms" is not without some merit, as it is noteworthy that while 15-20 firms did obtain a share, the lion's share went to a few foreign trade capital companies with great material resources and the ability to deposit the required high rate of guarantee.

Thus, for instance, it is clear that while 15 firms did get a share in the quotas for the controversial category 348 (ladies' shorts, jump suits, and trousers), half of the quota was allocated to a single firm (that is, Erpeks, the foreign trade company of Ercan Holding) and that the total share of the quota allocated to the Erpeks and the foreign trade capital firms Penta, Mentesoglu, and Edpa (that is, four companies) amounted to 88.8 percent of the whole quota. A similar situation can be seen in category 339, where a great many small and medium-size manufacturer-exporter firms were not allocated any quotas--while 5 of the 27 firms which did receive allocations ended up with 78 percent of the total.

The lists prepared by the General Secretariat of the Exporters Association show that the U.S. lists are about to be completely filled in categories 335 and 341 as well.

The Office of the Treasury and Foreign Trade, into whose court "the ball has been placed" by all the parties and which now expect it to take the initiative to settle their dispute, yesterday broke its "silence" for the first time since the beginning of the quota dispute. Mahir Barutcu, deputy under secretary of the treasury and foreign trade, who participated in the meeting in Ankara attended by all concerned, said the following yesterday in answer to our questions: "The use of quotas is a very recent innovation in our country. As in any innovation, problems are inevitable. We are currently going through a transitional period. I am hopeful that with the technical assistance that the Treasury will provide to the Exporters Association, the issue of the allocation of quotas will soon be settled."

Mahir Barutcu also cautioned the various sides engaged in ruthlessly accusing each other over the issue of quotas: "If they turn the matter into a personal issue and run each other down, they will be the losers. Instead of mutual recrimination, they should put on their thinking caps; do some hard thinking, and find a solution."

Barutcu pointed out that the Office of the Under Secretary of the Treasury and Foreign Trade has transferred its authority to issue quotas to the private sector. He explained: "The private sector has its own association and its own people. We could organize this matter from above, but we do not consider this desirable. In the final analysis, what we have done is to put them where they have to implement their own decisions."

Mahir Barutcu declared that, as may happen in any new situation, the association may have experienced shortcomings in the quota allocation from the viewpoint of personnel, staff, and knowledgeability. He said: "We in the Treasury will provide them with the necessary technical assistance until they can stand on their own feet. We have, in fact, begun doing so. We are passing on to them the data we have on our computers. In addition, we shall place a supplementary unit at the Exporters Association to help solve the problem. In fact, a new building has been provided. The problems will be solved more easily when the textiles and ready-to-wear clothing industry, which has been developing strongly in recent years, becomes a separate unit. Barutcu asked that instead of mutual recriminations, the parties involved in the present dispute get together and define what sort of assistance and contribution they expect from the Treasury and communicate their wishes to Ankara.

Commenting on those who are raising their voices to complain that they failed to get a share of the quota, Barutcu said: "There is no doubt that there are problems in the present way of handling the matter. But even if the problems are settled and the association is well and truly organized, those who fail to get an allocation due to late applications will again raise a clamor, and like a child unable to get pocket money, blame others indiscriminately."

**Who Got What Share in the Filled U.S. Quotas?**

Category 339 (doz)		Izmir
<b>Istanbul</b>		
1. Penta Dis Tic.	37,883	1. Sümerbank Izmir 5,000
2. Izdas Dis Tic.	33,891	2. Imeks Dis Tic. 13,176
3. Hazet Dis Tic.	32,567	3. Meptas 2,052
4. Temel Pazarlama	31,617	<b>Izmir total</b> 20,228
5. Fepas Dis Tic.	28,310	<b>Grand total</b> 232,266
6. Edpa Paz.	8,144	
7. Narin Paz.	5,716	
8. Okan Dis Tic.	5,506	
9. Ram Dis Tic.	4,904	
10. Intra Giy. San	4,900	
11. Biltex	4,200	
12. Ribatek Tekstil	3,747	
13. Enteks Dis Tic.	3,350	
14. Saner Dis Tic.	2,800	
15. Mentesoglu Ihr.	1,465	
16. Bem Dis Tic. A.S.	1,140	
17. Enka Pazarlama	760	
18. Durusel Hali	500	
19. Erpeks Dis Tic.	303	
20. Zeteks Dis Tic.	120	
21. Bilkont Dis Tic.	90	
22. Orsan Giy. San.	83	
23. Marmara Dis Tic.	14	
24. Aksan Bayan Cam.	12	
25. Arder Deri	9	
26. Penyelüks	4	
27. Rozeteks Giyim	3	
<b>Istanbul Total</b>	<b>212,038</b>	
<b>Izmir</b>		
1. Imeks Dis Tic.	4,285	
2. Izdas Dis Tic.	538	
<b>Izmir total</b>	<b>4,823</b>	
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>141,120</b>	

Note: The filled parts of the quotas are the uncommitted sections. Category 339 is for T-shirts and Category 348 for ladies' shorts and jump suits.

Source: General Secretariat of the Exporters Association of the Office of the Under Secretary of the Treasury and Foreign Trade.

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CSO: 3554/07

ECONOMIC


TURKEY

THREE MAJOR ROUTES OF TURNPIKE PROJECT DESCRIBED

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 26 Aug 86 p 3

[Text] Ankara--TERCUMAN--Visions of the TETEK (Turkish Turnpikes) project embellish the dreams of Prime Minister and Motherland Party [ANAP] leader Turgut Ozal. Turgut Ozal, who has directed the Ministry of Public Works and Resettlement to complete a major portion of the project by 1988, is reported to have said that "when this project is completed, it will emerge as one of the greatest deeds of the ANAP government."

Through this project, in which Prime Minister Turgut Ozal takes a very close interest, Turkey will be connected by turnpikes from one end of the country to the other.



First Route

In accordance with the TETEK project, which will be completed in stages by 1990, the first route will begin at the border gate with Bulgaria and follow the following itinerary: Istanbul, Bolu, Gerede, Ilgaz, Merzifon, Amasya, Erbaa, Niksar, Erzincan, Tercan, Erzurum, Horasan, Eleskirt, Agri, Dogubeyazit, and the Gurbulak border gate.

#### **Second Route**

This route will begin at the junction at Gerede and extend through Ankara, Sereflikochisar, Ulukisla, Adana, and Toprakkale to the Cilvegoz border gate on the Syrian border.

#### **Third Route**

This will begin at the Toprakkale junction and extend through Komurler, Gaziantep, Birecik, and Sanliurfa to the Habur border gate on the Iraqi border.

Officials say that the project aims at building new roads, but its intention is also to improve existing roads. In this road network, which carries a major part of the international transport traffic passing through Turkey, lighted signals in conformity with usage abroad will be provided where necessary and vertical and horizontal road signs will be upgraded to the appropriate level.

13184/9365  
CSO: 3554/07

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

VON BUELOW URGES FORWARD DEFENSE ROLE FOR TERRITORIAL UNITS

Not Discussed Within SPD

Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 20 Oct 86 p 5

[Article by sza., Bonn, 19 October: "Von Buelow Proposes New Army Concept; Discussed with neither SPD Defense Experts nor Chancellor Candidate Rau"]

[Text] SPD Bundestag member Andreas von Buelow has introduced in Bonn a recommendation for a new structure for the FRG army. His "entrance into the structural inability to attack" envisions, among other things, the stationing of 142 Home Defense regiments containing 2,000 infantry soldiers each in a 50-kilometer-wide strip along the FRG border with the GDR and the CSSR and the creation of such a regiment for each of the rural districts in the remainder of the FRG. The missions of the air force would remain unchanged. Von Buelow, who has not coordinated his concept with either the SPD's defense policy makers or their chancellor candidate Rau, has not dealt with the question of the navy.

The decrease in the number of those eligible for compulsory military service allegedly makes it impossible to maintain the FRG's defense contribution in its present structure and its present extent. He pleads for a split term of compulsory military service: 15 months for soldiers in mobile units (42 armored brigades are meant here) and 12 months for members of the home defense regiments. The latter, however, would have to take part regularly in short military exercises. The armored brigades, which would be stationed behind the border chain formed by the infantry regiments, would have to be staffed at 80-90 percent of full strength, while the home defense regiments would be staffed at only 8-10 percent of full strength. They would, if needed, be quickly brought to wartime strength through use of reservists. During peacetime, one could get by with about 400,000 active soldiers, instead of the 456,000 planned now. Wartime strength of 1.34 million men would remain unchanged.

Von Buelow said that the current NATO defense structure should remain essentially untouched. The reorganization of the FRG army would take 10-15 years. One would have to work pragmatically from the present structures, which could not be junked overnight. First-class and modern arms with antitank and antiaircraft weapons would be necessary. Defense of our own air space would have to be strengthened on the whole. That would require the

purchase of a new fighter plane. One must negotiate with the East Bloc that they, on their side, would occupy a "hedgehog" defense structure incapable of extensive ground-capturing operations and that the "sword units" (armored units are meant here) would either be moved back into the Soviet Union or else be deactivated. Stability during a time of crisis could thus be increased and the pressure in the West to turn to atomic weapons early in order to balance their weakness in conventional weapons could be decreased.

#### Conservative Critique of Proposal

Bonn DIE WELT in German 20 Oct 86 p 12

[Article by Ruediger Moniac: "Buelow's Concept for Reorganization of the FRG Army; SPD Bundestag Member Wants More Home Defense Regiments Created"]

[Text] SPD Bundestag member Andreas von Buelow has repeated the assertion, which is questioned by Defense Ministry experts, that the FRG army is, because of its structure and equipment, capable of carrying out an attack with armored units upon territory east of the FRG border. This notion of the alleged attack capability of the FRG army had already set the tone for debate at the SPD party congress in Nuernberg and had led to the demand for "reorganization of the FRG army in the direction of defensive arms" which "should during the 1990's open the way for significant reductions."

Buelow, who as chairman of the defense policies commission of the SPD executive committee had basically controlled preparations for the Nuernberg party congress in spite of strong resistance from other commission members and who has indicated the course for his party in the direction of a position which underestimates the military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact, sketched out in an essay his ideas for a FRG army "structurally incapable of attack." It was reported that he did this without the agreement of the commission, and he thus represents exclusively his own opinion.

The decisive passage in this essay states: "The Warsaw Pact bases its conventional military defense upon comparable structures (Editor: such as the FRG army and other NATO land forces on FRG territory). An armored company in the East differs very little from an armored company in the West. Only the declared policy of both sides not to want to attack makes the difference between offensive and counteroffensive structures, which are indistinguishable from the viewpoint of arms and tactics. The logic carried again and again into the field offers no decisive evidence to the contrary."

#### German Ability To Improvise

To the objection made during an interview with journalists that, for example, the brigades did not have at their disposal adequate transport capacity to supply large quantities of munitions and fuel over many hundreds of kilometers, Buelow responded with the answer that the German ability to improvise was already great during World War II. At that time, even civilian vehicles had been requisitioned in large numbers for this task. One could not understand why this should not happen again in the future.

not understand why this should not happen again in the future.

#### Completely New Structure

So, while Buelow casts suspicion upon his own side as to whether the operational concept of "forward defense" does not envision the taking of territory in case of war but exclusively the recapture of lost terrain, he is contrarily ready to give apparently unlimited credence to whatever his Soviet discussion group members had to say.

The SPD politician quoted the Soviet Col Gen Chervov, who told him along with others that the Soviets would during the next decade be interested in reducing by half the number of divisions in the "GDR." This must be tested, said von Buelow, which is why it is in his opinion correct to completely restructure the FRG army.

He would like to reduce their peacetime strength to 400,000 men, but to leave the "old NATO-integrated defense structure essentially untouched for now." The FRG field army should consist of 42 armored brigades with a peacetime staffing level of 80-90 percent and a defensive strength of 3,000 men each. He would like to see half of the infantry capability in current brigades taken over by territorial defense troops. He envisions the massive creation of home defense regiments for this purpose. For forward defense, they should reinforce armored defense forces with infantry battle support. Such a regiment with 2,000 men should protect a terrain sector with a width of 20 kilometers. The home defense regiments in the rear should be distributed on the basis of perhaps one per rural district and in peacetime should have a maximum staffing level of 10 percent active duty personnel.

Buelow would like to retain basic compulsory military service for armored brigades at the period of 15 months, and to shorten that period for the home defense regiments to 12 months. The organizations of the field army and the territorial army should be combined.

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CSO: 3620/50

MILITARY

SPAIN

INCREASE REPORTED IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGICAL RESEARCH

Barcelona LA VANGUARDIA in Spanish 22 Oct 86 p 15

[Article by Pedro Conde Zabala]

[Text] Madrid. Spain's investment in military research has multiplied 38 times in the last 7 years, even though we still invest 5 times less than France, and we are still among the less developed countries in military research spending. This increase in investments is greater than in any other country in the world, the secretary of state for defense, Eduardo Serra, told the Senate.

Spain will invest 15.5 billion pesetas in defense research projects in 1987. This is 38 times the 400 million Spain spent on military research in 1980, the secretary of state of the ministry of defense, Eduardo Serra, told the Senate, while speaking about "new technologies in defense and security."

Serra added that these investments help to create wealth, to increase jobs, and to improve the balance of payments, with priority given to military research and development applications which have spin-offs in civilian fields. According to the secretary of state, "the gains from the FACA program have catapulted our aeronautic industry to a leading role." He indicated that we are still ranked among the less developed countries in military research spending, and that Italy is the next goal for us to surpass, while "we still invest 5 times less than France on research and development."

Research

From the level of 400 million pesetas committed to military research in 1980, Spain's spending rose to 2 billion in 1984, 4 billion in 1985, and 10.5 billion in 1986. The jump up to 15.5 billion scheduled for 1987 is a 38-fold increase in 7 years. "This can not be matched by any other country in the world."

Serra also reported that this year's defense budget included a 1.9 percent increase, while the 1987 budget plans a 10.50 percent rise, bringing it to 700 billion. There is to be a 51 percent increase in research and development.

Of the 700 billion, half is for materiel and the other half for personnel costs. Of this total budget, between 7 and 8 percent is for military research; 100 billion will be used for maintenance, and 250 billion for investments.

The air force will benefit most from this funding, rather than the army or navy. In 1984 the air force received 33 percent of the defense budget; this level rose to 66 percent in 1986, and it is scheduled to be allocated 83 percent in 1987. This is primarily caused by the purchase of F-18A aircraft for the FACA program.

The secretary of state spoke of "the enormous effort we have to make if we do not want to strip our present defense system and lose our future defenses, though I do believe that the foundations have already been laid to meet the needs of the FAS [Armed Forces?].

On the subject of research and development projects for the future, Mr Serra spoke of the ACE [European Fighter Aircraft], the Maverick air-to-air missile, and the "frigate of the 1990s." The minister of defense is to sign the ACE memorandum today. CASA, Sener, and Inisel are working on this project. Marconi, Santa Barbara, and CASA are involved with the missile project, and Bazan is working on the frigate program.

Serra noted that the number of research and development programs has been cut in half, and that at present the major projects concern "hovercraft," an air cushion system that can replace landing craft; a future radar system; the AX tactical aircraft; the 105-mm gun; the 40/70 anti-aircraft weapon; bridges; infrared fuses; bombs and explosives; and submarine instrumentation.

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CSO: 3548/22

MILITARY

SPAIN

MILITARY CHIEFS CRITICIZE NEW DEFENSE BUDGET

Madrid EL ALCAZAR in Spanish 23 Oct 86 p 9

[Article by Olvido Obregon]

[Text] The military budgets are not large enough to ensure the operational status of the armed forces, and only cover the indispensable minimum, the three chiefs of staff agreed yesterday when speaking to the Congressional Budget Committee. They appeared before the committee, along with other top defense officials. To questions of the CDS and Popular Coalition deputies who had requested their appearance before the committee, they each pointed out the deficiencies of their respective allocations.

When questioned by the centrist representative, Jose Ramon Caso, about the truth of the explanations for various budget programs, which seem to suggest that the maintenance of the armed forces is lower than the level of security or of response in case of conflict warrants, the army chief of staff replied that the budgets for his branch of the service "are not sufficient to maintain the operational status that we all want, but," he added, "this is happening in all branches of the armed forces and in all state agencies." Lt Gen Saenz de Tejada explained that the army's budget for maintenance is divided into support and investment, and he noted that the army is carrying out, "with sacrifice, a program of cutbacks. For example, we are eliminating six operational brigades, in the near future one in the Seventh Region and one in the Eighth. We are abolishing 6,504 officers' positions, and scaling down the army's deployment. This sacrifice deserves compensation in terms of better equipment. We have absolutely antiquated equipment, but we do understand that the state can not take care of everything." Saenz de Tejada further stated that the armed forces tolerate these deficiencies and accept these risks, since that is what the government has decided, but he denied the charge that the army does not have an adequate level of training; he said it is even "exaggerated" in some instances, for example, for special units. In terms of the obsolescence of military housing, the army chief of staff said that "we are deeply concerned about this," but he noted that with the closure of many barracks as a result of the reduction in the number of units, "we will be making some progress with our infrastructure."

The chiefs of staff of the navy and air force expressed themselves in similar terms. Admiral De Salas Cardenal divided the navy's budget into investment, support, maintenance and training costs. In terms of investment, he said that the navy is not going to begin any new projects, and they have adjusted their investment to "finish what has been started. In terms of support," he said, "we are at the minimum indispensable level so that the deterioration will not be irredeemable." Under the heading of maintenance, he said that the Spanish navy, with an average of 80 days of navigation, is at the minimum level of the western nations, and that in launch and firing operations, it is below the European average. Finally, in training "the problem is going to grow worse, because of the reduction of the length of military service."

Lt Gen Santos Peralba, air force chief of staff, said he felt the air force was in a similar position. In the air force, investments exceed the amount spent for support, "but support is very important and there is no other remedy but to keep it up if we want a force that can respond to the mission entrusted to it." The lieutenant general described his overall budget as a "minimum that will be dangerous if it is not increased in order to maintain flight safety." On this point, he admitted that a high percentage of aviation accidents are attributable to human error, "because our pilots are subjected to demands of different types than in other western air forces. We have a small number of flight units and they are assigned multiple training missions, thus overloading them."

#### Eduardo Serra's Remarks

During the morning session the secretary of state, the undersecretary, and the director general of information and social relations of the ministry of defense spoke. Secretary of state Eduardo Serra responded to questions from the deputies. He stated, among other points, that for 1987 the proportion of the budget for materiel with relation to personnel is going to be reworked, that the credits contained in the agreement with the United States are excessive, as \$600 million has not been used, and he denied reports that the central organ of the ministry of defense is going to become a fourth branch of the armed forces because of its excessive growth, as Jose Ramon Caso maintained. Serra had a lively discussion with the communist deputy Tamames, who said that military spending accounts for 3.38 percent of all the budgets, but that even so our armed forces are still not operational. "With the aviation we have in Spain," said the United Left representative, "we can not confront an aggressive model of the NATO type. This is an absurd situation."

Undersecretary Gustavo Suarez said that the expansion of the special volunteer force is one of the ministry's short-term objectives, and it is expected that during 1987 15,000 young recruits will join under these conditions. At the same time, he also said that for 1987 they do expect

"a certain influx of requests for temporary reserve status," so the funding contained in the budgets for this item will have to be increased soon. He also announced that military hospitals will work together with Social Security to join in the Health Law budgets, within the National Health System.

The secretary of state for defense, Eduardo Serra, said that Spain's financial contribution to NATO in 1987 will be approximately 1.1 billion pesetas.

Serra later specified that 621 million of this 1.1 billion will be payments made to the budgets of dependent organizations of NATO's military committee, but which are not included in the Alliance's military structure, such as the NATO college in Rome.

Another 40 million will be used for NATO's NAMSO [NATO Infrastructure and Standardization Agency?], and 400 million will go to organizations connected with NATO's civilian structure.

The PDP [People's Democratic Party] deputy Iñigo Cavero asked about the amount budgeted for food for the troops, which is to be 230 pesetas a day plus 5 percent. "I am frankly surprised," he declared, "that we will spend less for feeding our troops than on food for our penal institutions, where at least only sedentary activities are conducted."

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CSO: 3548/22

MILITARY

SPAIN

DEFENSE MINISTER REPORTEDLY PLANS REORGANIZATION

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 30 Oct 86 p 10

[Article by Fernando Reinlein]

[Text] The minister of defense, Narcis Serra, is planning a new reorganization of the department. One of the first steps in this move, the new reorganization of central organs, will be approved by decree within 1 month, DIARIO 16 learned from informed sources.

This reorganization was described as of major importance by the military sources consulted by this newspaper. When it is completed, in all probability it will mean the creation of two new general divisions, one for services and another for education, which will both be subordinate to the under-secretary of defense.

The first division, now ready for a decision to be made about its central organs, will be approved shortly. The reorganization of its peripheral organs is scheduled for next year; this is an objective the minister has announced for the legislature. In practice, this will mean the abolition of the present military governments.


The functions of the present military governments will be taken over by ministry of defense delegations in the provincial capitals, and it will be these delegations which will be responsible for recruiting young people to enlist in military service.

For the general division of education, a project now in the definition stages, the need for such a division is being created by the reforms in military education--one of the department's ongoing projects--despite the adjustments that have been made, and it is to be dealt with during the term of the present legislature.

Subordination

The ministry of defense reorganization is its third since its creation. The first was implemented by royal decree 2723/77 of 2 November. The second and perhaps the most important reorganization was ordered by royal decree 135/84,

and entailed the integration of the three branches of the armed forces into the organic structure of the ministry, thus establishing a system of both organic and functional subordination.



This will be the new structure of the ministry of defense, with the addition of two new general divisions. The shaded boxes indicate leadership posts held by civilians.

Key:

1. Ministry of defense structure
2. Minister
3. Consultative and advisory collegiate organs
4. Technical cabinet
5. JUJEM [Joint Chiefs of Staff]
6. CSE [Army Supreme Council]
7. CSA [Navy Supreme Council]
8. CSEA [Air Force Supreme Council]
9. Cabinet
10. Secretary of state of defense
11. JEMAD [Defense Chief of Staff]
12. Secretary of state level
13. EMACON
14. Undersecretariat of defense
15. JEME

16. AJEMA
17. JEMA
18. Undersecretary level
19. General division of the Civil Guard
20. CESID
21. General division of economic affairs
22. General division of armament and materiel
23. General division of infrastructure
24. DRISDE
25. General division of personnel
26. General technical department
27. General division of services
28. General division of education
29. General division of defense policy
30. CESEDEN
31. Director general level

At the present time the ministry's structure entails the subordination under the minister of the three branches of the armed forces, the defense general staff, the department of state, the undersecretariat, and the general divisions of the Civil Guard and of CESID. There are another two general divisions of a purely military nature, defense policy and CESEDEN [Supreme National Defense Studies Center], which are subordinate to the defense general staff. Another three general divisions, economic affairs, materiel support, and infrastructure are under the department of state. The general division of personnel, the technical department, and DRISDE are subordinate to the undersecretariat. The two new divisions planned--services and education--will also be subordinate to this undersecretariat.

In terms of appointments, the replacement of the present JUJEM [Joint Chiefs of Staff] will create a series of vacancies, two of which will affect the ministry. If the appointments of Admiral Nardiz and of Lt General Michavilla are confirmed, the top posts in the general divisions of defense policy and of personnel will be left vacant. The first will be assigned to a high-level military officer, but the second could be occupied by a civilian, an extreme being talked about at the ministry in recent days.

#### Candidates

The strongest candidates for the JUJEM are, according to the media, Lt Gen Gonzalo Puigcerver from the Royal Household; Lt Generals Iniguez and Michavilla, and Admiral Nardiz. The selection will be made at the council of ministers session on Friday, when the appointment of a civilian, Luis Roldan, to head the general division of the Civil Guard, will also be made official.

So there will be eight civilians, including the minister, holding posts of high responsibility in the ministry. They are: Eduardo Serra, secretary of state; Gustavo Suarez Partierra, undersecretary; Luis Reverter, director of DRISDE; Antonio Flos Bassols, technical secretary general; Jose Ignacio Moscoso, director general of economic affairs; and Ricardo Robles, manager of ISFAS, with the rank of director general, plus Luis Roldan as the head of the Civil Guard, who was just mentioned.

As for other major shifts after the appointment of the new JUDEM, it appears that Gen Alonso Manglano will continue to head the CESID, a position that is independent of military rank. This will enable him to continue directing defense information services if he is promoted to lieutenant general. As for the recently retired Gen Andres Cassinello, it is highly probable that he will be appointed to Ceuta, with the position of general commandant.

7679

CSO: 3548/22

MILITARY

SWEDEN

MILITARY REPORTS REVEAL SUSPECTED SUB INCURSIONS

Mine Sweeper Makes Probable Sighting

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 21 Oct 86 p 6

[Article by Anders Ohman: "Fifteen Suspected Sub Sightings"]

[Text] Four times in half an hour the crew of the Coast Guard's minesweeper, Skafto, saw a submarine conning tower with masts in a wave in northern Kalmarsund 22 July of this year.

The defense staff says in its quarterly report on submarine defense operations that a sub was "possibly" in the area. Fifteen cases of suspected undersea activity have been detected in Swedish waters during the third quarter, mainly in July and August.

At the same time that the defense staff made its report public on Monday, the chief of the minesweeper, Skafto, Captain Staffan Littorin, said in an interview for TIDNINGARNAS TELEGRAMBYRA that it must have been a submarine he saw.

The Skafto incident is described in the supreme commander's report. On 22 July the minesweeper, which is a support craft for divers, was on its way north through the northern part of Kalmarsund. The weather was fine with a heat haze and water as smooth as glass. The crew's families were on board for a family day.

Moved

The duty officer spied with his telescope at a long distance a reef lying on the wrong side of a sea marker. The ship's commander was called, and when he observed the reef in the telescope he said that it was a part of a submarine's conning tower with masts. Skafto set its course toward the object, and the watch was increased. The object moved and disappeared slowly under the water. The military authorities were notified.

Skafto made a port turn and took a countercourse to try to see the object. There was no sign of the sub when they reached the place of first observation.

The supreme commander's report states that three more observations were made by the crew, which was completely convinced that a sub had been in the area.

Pictures were taken with both large and small cameras. One of the pictures is included in the supreme commander's incident report, but according to the defense staff, the picture quality is not good enough to be considered proof.

#### Impaired

The pictures cannot confirm what the crew saw in the four cases. But they can represent an object with wave motion around it.

"In the light of the testimony of the witnesses, the decision would have been 'probably a sub' if the pictures had been better," H.G. Wessberg, first staff editor of DAGENS NYHETER, said. Now the decision is "possibly a sub." The strong heat haze existing at the time impaired the photographs.

Another sighting that is called possible by the defense staff was made by two youths windsurfing in the waters near Hudiksvall. They suddenly heard a noise and dropped their sails into the water. At a distance of 30-50 meters they saw a dark object lying quietly on the surface of the water. It was not affected by the heaving of the sea. The object sank softly under the surface of the water and did not show itself again.

The youths later drew a picture of the object. Their statements were in agreement with and correspond to earlier observations. The defense staff has not found any natural explanation. The decision is that they saw "part of a sub."

#### Aground

In its incident report, the defense staff shows how easy it is to make a mistake about an object that is believed to be a sub. A sailor reported a 10-15 meter long object that looked like a submarine conning tower. The sailor thought that a sub had come into distress and run aground.

The navy's reconnaissance revealed that the "sub" was a bank at the water's surface with a sea marker above it.

The defense staff's analyses, which include 15 cases of suspected foreign underwater operations, indicate that incursions in Swedish coastal waters are continuing. No nation can be identified.

The defense staff sees a change in the summer's reports. The suspected cases of foreign underwater operations come from Norrland's coast and from the area where the submarine defense forces do not operate, or where the regular guarding of defense installations has been increased.

"This shows we are now on the right path in the present buildup of submarine defense," Wessberg said.

### Watchfulness

The navy has with its efforts increased the risks for intrusions by foreign powers so that at certain times and in certain areas Sweden can deter the violations.

The number of reports is so high because the public has a strong tendency to make reports during summer months. Supreme Commander Bengt Gustafsson is satisfied with this watchfulness.

Three violations by surface vessels have occurred during the period, none of them serious. They took place in the open waters outside of Stromstad, southwest of Goteborg, and in the Malmo area. The violation outside of Stromstad occurred in connection with the NATO maneuver, "Northern Wedding."

Swedish airspace has been violated ten times during the period. This is considered to be in the normal range.

### Coastal Corvette Hydrophone Spots Sub

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 24 Oct 86 p 18

[Article by Anders Ohman: "Trailer Hydrophone Contacts Sub"]

[Text] One of the navy's coastal corvettes spotted a foreign submarine early last summer in Swedish territorial waters in Aland Sea outside Stockholm's northern archipelago. Naval sources revealed this to DAGENS NYHETER.

The foreign sub was discovered by hydrophone and could be tracked when it changed course after being discovered and headed for the Swedish territorial border twelve sea miles from the coast. No weapons were used.

During the same period the navy made a submarine chase in Stockholm's northern archipelago and listened for a time in an area around Vidingefjarden southeast of Kapellskar. Weapons were used twice against suspected foreign underwater activity.

Rear Admiral Claes Tornberg, commander of the coastal fleet, confirmed the submarine incident, but does not want to go into detail. But the action is proof of the performance of the new coastal corvette in the strengthened defense against submarines.

Same Group

The two coastal corvettes, Stockholm and Malmo, are included in the same submarine defense group. During the summer they were in operation in submarine defense in spite of the fact that they were not delivered until May. Modern, technically complicated combat vessels normally have a longer break-in period.

The coastal corvette's discovery of the foreign sub in Aland Sea is a step forward for the new hydrophone technique found on board the vessel. It is a trailer hydrophone, "The Fish," of French make, that is lowered to a suitable depth. There the hydrophone sends out signals that track foreign subs. When the signals hit the sub they return and are analysed on board. The object is classified and identified.

Active hydrophone search of this type can be made at a distance of 100 kilometers, depending upon the conditions for the spread of sound under water.

The hydrophone technology of the coastal corvettes is different from that of the helicopter in that the echoes can be classified more rapidly. The navy is waiting for a breakthrough that will enable the national identification of submarines.

#### Bank

During the submarine defense of recent years, the navy has consistently built up a bank of various vessel sounds. The analysis of the hydroacoustic information is expected to be as reliable as possible for the technical proof of the type of vessel.

The two coastal corvettes Stockholm and Malmo are the first in a series of six that are being built at the Karlskron shipyard. They enter the coastal fleet's surface attack flotilla together with robot and patrol boats. So far the navy is very satisfied with the coastal corvettes' performance and seagoing qualities. The crews are more comfortable and can stay at sea longer than the smaller patrol boats.

The increased effectiveness of the new coastal corvettes against subs and their staying power make up a step on the way toward a strong submarine protection, according to Claes Tornberg, the commander of the coastal fleet.

"We have come a little way toward becoming better. Before we were like a house without a lock. A thief could simply go in and take what he wanted."

"Now we have put a lock on the door. The risk has increased a little for the thief, who is perhaps somewhat worried," Tornberg said.

#### "Land Crab"

The comment by the Finnish president, Mauno Koivisto, about the supreme commander's latest report on submarine incursions has caused the navy to raise its eyebrows somewhat. The president thinks that either there are no subs at all or that if there are incursions into Swedish waters, they are not from Soviet subs.

The president's thoughts on the ability of the submarines to orient themselves are considered by naval experts to be "like the reflections of a land crab."

A submarine can easily orient itself with the help of a gyrocompass, log (speedometer), echo-sounder, hydrophone, radar, and Decca navigator. In an underwater situation a sub can navigate very well just with log and compass.

Modern submarine logs are correct to a few hundredth of a percentage point and can in combination with a gyrocompass function as inertial navigation. Just with the help of the periscope the sub can fix its position exactly.

9124

CSO: 3650/19

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

SPAIN

SULFURIC ACID SUSPECTED OF CAUSING HUELVA FISH KILL

Madrid ABC in Spanish 23 Oct 86 p 48

[Article by Vicente Quiroga]

[Text] Huelva--The controversy over who is responsible for the killing of thousands of fish in the Huelva Estuary is continuing. The complaints lodged so far--among them one by the ecology coordinator--have been supplemented by a report to the court concerning a possible ecological offense which may have caused the fish kill.

That supplemental report includes an extensive account of activities at the HQ-1 plant operated by Huelva Fertilizer, which belongs to the Rio Tinto Explosives (ERT) firm. A number of anomalies at that plant resulted in a difference of 152 metric tons between the amount of sulfuric acid produced and the amount placed in inventory around the time of the polluting incident, and the inference is that it may have been dumped into the riverbed.

According to data gathered during the inspections carried out at HQ-1 by experts from the AMA's Environmental Protection Section, those anomalies were due to voltage drops on the morning of Sunday the 12th that affected several of the plant's facilities. The complaint goes on to cover several points: as soon as dead fish were detected on the banks and in the middle of the estuary, experts from the AMA inspected several firms in the industrial zone. Their inspection of the Huelva Fertilizer plant on the 18th of this month yielded various records which were carefully studied. The result was a report noting a loss of 152 metric tons between the time the acid was produced and the time it was pumped. That missing tonnage may have been dumped into the estuary. It is estimated that 200,000 kilograms of fish were injured or killed.

The Health and Consumption Office of the Junta of Andalucia has analyzed various samples collected by its own departments and those of the AMA. Those samples reveal high acidity in the water and various lesions on the fish, from which it is deduced that polluting substances were dumped. That information, duly documented, has also been turned over to the court for proper action. For their part, the AMA's experts are continuing their investigation to determine whether any anomalies can be detected at other firms on the banks of the Odiel River, so the case is still open.

All of this contrasts with repeated statements by the business association in the industrial zone, which has asserted that "with regard to the information of a speculative and gratuitous nature that has been circulated" and its connection with the Huelva Fertilizer plant, that information is flatly denied, and it is "reaffirmed that neither the HQ-1 plant nor any other plant in the industrial zone has carried out operations resulting in instances of dumping whose consequences could have caused a change in the environmental conditions in the estuary."

Plant manager Jaime Prieto said that since he had not seen the AMA report, he could not discuss its data. He also said that the firm's books "do not show those figures," and he insisted that "it cannot be deduced" from the firm's internal data "that 152 metric tons are missing." Jaime Prieto reiterated that "no operation related to the plant's maintenance and production could have caused variations in the amounts we dump into the estuary."

In another development, the 15 fishermen from Palos de la Frontera who have been conducting a sit-in at the town hall for the past 6 days to protest "the progressive destruction of the zone's fishing resources due to the constant dumping that has been occurring" plan to continue their protest until they are granted help that will allow them to survive, since according to them, every trace of fish in the estuary--and, consequently, their means of livelihood--has been done away with.

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